DigitalCommons@NYLS
Articles & Chapters

Faculty Scholarship

2020

Method Lawyering: Immersion Teaching Illustrated
Kris Franklin
New York Law School, kris.franklin@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters

Recommended Citation
Franklin, Kris, "Method Lawyering: Immersion Teaching Illustrated" (2020). Articles & Chapters. 1347.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1347

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

METHOD LAWYERING1
IMMERSION TEACHING ILLUSTRATED

Kris Franklin*
Scenario: Frankie and Saanvi are a lesbian couple who
have been together for almost two decades. They met in
college and are now in their mid-thirties. They had never
really thought about getting married, but in the wake of
legal and political changes in the U.S., as well as changes
in their employment and financial status, changing
community mores around legalized same sex marriage, and
discussions of the possibility of having and legally
protecting children, they are beginning to explore the
option. Both partners work in creative fields. In recent
years Saanvi’s work has been especially well-received.
Much to both partners’ surprise, Saanvi has been
generating substantial income over the last few years and
has become unexpectedly wealthy.
Through the vantage point of a lesbian couple
ambivalent about the institution of marriage, this scenario
traces most of the central legal questions surrounding
marriage and divorce, conceiving and raising children,
owning property within married relationships, and
preparing for and resolving dissolution of a marital union.
INTRODUCTION
Teaching Law by Immersion
Informed by the adage “show, don’t tell,” this Article seeks to provide an
immersive introduction to immersive teaching and learning in law school.
“Method Lawyering” is both a reversal of the Lawyering Method elements used as a
framing device throughout this work, and an allusion to method actors’ efforts to immerse
themselves in the totality of their characters to gain a deeper understanding of their
circumstances. Method actors believe that there is no other way to gain such a rich sense of
their characters’ contexts then to understand and identify with their lives to the greatest extent
achievable. The immersion teaching discussed here similarly seeks expanded comprehension
through experience.
*
Professor of Law and Director of Academic Initiatives, New York Law School. Much
appreciation to the many colleagues who have provided comments on early drafts of this
article, including participants in the NY Family Law Scholars Workshop and the NYLS
Faculty Colloquium.
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Professor Peggy Cooper Davis,2 together with her collaborator Danielle
Davenport,3 initially wrote the above-sketched scenario as a portion of the
Family Practice4 course they taught together at NYU School of Law (now
with Brence Pernell5). The scenarios were subsequently adapted for a 2018
Harvard Law School seminar Professional Responsibility in Family Practice
taught by Professor Davis,6 and then again reshaped for use in a simulationbased family law survey entitled Family Law in Practice that I teach at New
York Law School.7 These various courses differ significantly in purpose and
pitch, though all are centered on student-lawyers working through the same
principal narratives.8 In addition to sharing the central stories and characters,
this array of quite disparate courses uses a common instructional model that
we9 call the Immersion Method.10
2

John S.R. Shad Professor of Lawyering and Ethics & Director, Experiential Learning
Lab, NYU School of Law.
3
Actor, playwright, and Teaching Fellow, NYU School of Law Experiential Learning
Lab.
4
See https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29420.
5
Assistant General Counsel, MRDC and Adjunct Professor, NYU School of Law.
6
See https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29421.
7
See
https://www.nyls.edu/academics/j_d_course_of_study/curriculum/coursedetail/?course=4935.
8
The Frankie/Saanvi scenario makes up the bulk of the courses discussed here, but all
also include a second scenario that introduces the child protection system and explores both
parental/familial autonomy and the oversight of the state. That scenario deepens students
understanding of tensions pertaining to liberty and order in the family law context, and raises
important considerations of race, class and education in family courts.
9
Pronoun references in this work are a little complicated. I owe a great debt to Davis
and Davenport as the primary creators of the characters these courses are centered around,
and to Davis as the originator of the instructional design all these courses utilize. I contributed
to the revision work that Davis and Davenport undertook to emphasize professional
responsibility issues for the Harvard version, and have intermittently continued to consult in
the ongoing partnership between Davis and Pernell. Simultaneously, with permission I
adapted the narratives to fit the needs and design of my own class. Thus, much of the work
and conversation around these courses has felt intensely collaborative. I therefore use “we”
in this article to refer to the fruitful intersections of this alliance. I use “I” when referring
solely to my own particular class.
10
As designated by Prof. Davis in a separate collaboration that included Davis, Susan
L. Brooks (Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law), Susan S. Kuo (South
Carolina School of Law) and me.
We want to be careful not to suggest, however, that we believe this kind of law teaching
is unprecedented. Others before us have built courses with educational goals growing out of
simulated client work. In fact Susan B. Apel, has already successfully done so in the same
field of family law. See Susan B. Apel, No More Casebooks: Using Simulation-Based
Learning to Educate Future Family Law Practitioners, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 700 (2011)
(hearinafter No More Casebooks). Relatedly, see Andrew Schepard & Herbie DiFonzo,
Hofstra’s Family Law With Skills Course: Implementing FLER (The Family Law Education
Reform Project), 49 FAM. CT. REV. 685 (2011). Regrettably, we were not aware of these
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The immersion method integrates doctrinal, practical and values training
in legal education by drawing freely from the most sophisticated techniques
of case method, simulation, and clinical teaching. Though some class
meetings look and feel like traditional case-driven law classes, the instruction
and learning in immersion courses—particularly of foundational legal
doctrine—is driven entirely by the simulated client work.11
Frequently in our immersion classes students are given some background
cases and statutes to start from. They are also sometimes given more directed
questions to consider while other students are working on different issues.
From these beginning points the student-lawyers must then formulate their
own research inquiries, acquaint themselves with the law in question, and
prepare to engage in the next lawyering task required by the case.12
Instructors devote considerable time in class meetings to helping students
unpack client narratives, identify legal issues, and plan their research and
client work. But in the immersion classroom there is often a collaborative feel
of the professor guiding what is ultimately a student-led discussion rather
than simply assigning work or interrogating students’ comprehension.
The lawyering tasks the students undertake in the course include
preparing case memos, briefing supervising attorneys, interviewing experts,
counseling clients, preparing documents for the client, and advocating or
negotiating on the client’s behalf. With faculty guidance and expert
supervision, students teach themselves the basics of family law doctrine13
prior works when we constructed our own family law immersion courses. It would have
undoubtedly enriched our work had we been. Yet there remains some benefit to having
arrived independently at similar objectives, and our goals are perhaps more global and less
directly preparatory for practice than theirs.
11
This coverage of legal rules in direct response to the requirements of well-chosen
simulations is what distinguishes immersive learning from the exercises many colleagues
add to their doctrinal instruction in casebook courses. Such simulations are frequently
wonderful opportunities for students to apply legal rules and consolidate their mastery of key
concepts, and I use these kinds of projects in many of my own courses. Yet I distinguish
them from fully immersive learning if they are designed to reinforce or supplement what is
conceived of as the core learning in a course.
12
This Article’s goal is to give readers some of the feel of what these classes do. A very
different type of writing would be required to detail all of the logistics of the course. It
therefore skims over important considerations such when we use actors in role as clients
(some, but deliberately as infrequently as possible to make the course economically feasible
and reproducible), how the course is scheduled (for mine, just like any other doctrinal class
that meets twice a week in an ordinary classroom), how we conduct in-role work in class
with a manageable number of students rather than the whole class, or how as faculty we
move back and forth between more professorial roles to acting in more supervisory capacities
to guide/coach students through the simulations. Any of us who teach these classes would be
happy to provide syllabi, materials, or consultation to other faculty who would be interested
in exploring this kind of teaching for their own courses.
13
We do ensure students learn the basic rules of family law they will need for practice
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while simultaneously practicing and critically examining lawyering
interactions, and honing their research, writing and legal drafting skills. In
my particular course roughly half of the class sessions are conducted entirely
in-role working on parts of the simulation. The remaining class sessions are
conducted as out-of-role workshops where the students and I work together
to ensure that they understand the law and the facts, have located the primary
sources they need, and that they understand them and are using them
effectively.14
As faculty, then, we get to lead the same kinds of careful examinations of
rules of law that more traditional Socratic classrooms generate, just done
through the lens of a specific client’s problems. Meanwhile our students learn
legal doctrine in ways that are likely to foster retention;15 reinforce basic law
school skills of case reading, statutory analysis, and application of rules to
facts, all while developing additional skills they will need in the profession.16
Immersion teaching helps fulfill the ABA mandate that law graduates
complete at least six credits of experiential coursework.17
and the bar exam. In my class this is tested by a take-home examination in which students
are expected to apply the rules they have learned to new facts which differ substantially from
those raised in the course simulations. This shows students (and my administration!) that
even in this new format they have covered what they would be expected to learn in a more
traditional family law course.
14
Others have pointed out that some of what this article describes and proposes may be
less of a radical (read: easier) shift for me than for some legal educators. I have perhaps an
unusually intersectional law teaching background. I began my career as a practitioner
handling individual cases, and I have substantial experience teaching a variety of traditional
doctrinal courses, along with simulation-based lawyering skills courses, legal writing and
research, all overlaid with a background in learning theory and academic enhancement. All
of these are at least somewhat relevant to undertaking the kind of immersion teaching this
article describes. But while that degree of variety in teaching assignments may not be
common, law professors bringing a diverse array of personal and professional expertise to
their classes is hardly unusual. I firmly believe that skilled law faculty who wanted to
undertake this kind of teaching could so do well no matter what their previous professional
path.
15
Nellie Munin & Yael Efron, Role-Playing Brings Theory to Life in a Multicultural
Learning Environment, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309, 313 (2017); see also Nadja Alexander &
Michelle LeBaron, Death of the Role-Play, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 459, 466 (2010)
(in-role work “is said to yield deeper and broader learning”). Empirical support for the
common assertion that experiential learning promotes retention has been especially well
documented in medical training. See for example Rahul R. Bogam, Effect of Simulation
Based Education on Knowledge of Medical Students in Context of Community Medicine, 3
INT’L J. MED. RES. & HEALTH SCI., 651 (2014).
16
That this is true both for family law specialist skills (i.e. drafting prenuptial
agreements), and for more general practice readiness (i.e. writing client advice letters or
negotiation).
17
ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
STANDARDS 301(b), 302 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2014-15).
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We love teaching immersion classes. They provide some of the structure
of traditional law teaching while pushing the boundaries of learning from
work that feels real and has a practical and personal dimension. There is
simply something different, deeper, and more magically enriched about
learning that arises from invested personal experience.
An Article Modeling Immersion Methodology
Rather than arguing It is framed in vignettes that illustrate parts of a
specific client problem, then move out toward thinking through (some of)18
what would be needed to address that problem, and then proceed more
abstractly toward using that experience to examine (some of)19 the processes
both student-lawyers and faculty-supervisors have engaged in.20
Each of the first four sections of this Article shows a portion of what
students do in the corresponding segment of the course. These sections then
come from a different angle to surface some of the considerations that went
into building and teaching that segment. I hope this structure provides an
intriguing dialogue between the student-lawyers’ processes and the faculty
processes that went into engineering those student experiences. The Article
then wraps up in Part V with a consideration of ways the immersion method
merges clinical methodology the essentially doctrinal/Langdellian purpose of
most law school lecture courses.
With such ambitiously layered objectives it may be helpful to have some
sort of grounding armature to structure this examination/modeling of the
immersion family law course. Many related-but-differing descriptions of the
components of experiential learning exist, and in this Article I am choosing
(not entirely arbitrarily) to rely on one version that shares a common DNA
with the genesis of this family law course: the Elements of the Lawyering
Method as developed and refined by the NYU Lawyering Program.21 The
18
All legal work is incredibly multi-faceted, and the dynamics of interpersonal
interaction and intrapersonal awareness add additional layers to lawyers’ professional work.
Thus the topics in any one of the snippets included here could easily fill volumes. I am critical
of the limitations of my own judgments about what to draw attention to, but then this Article
is intended to be illustrative rather than all-inclusive.
19
Id.
20
As, inevitably, do all client/problem-based teaching methodologies. See Wyatt G.
Sassman, Cases as Fictions: Clinical Methods in Teaching and Scholarship, 4 SAVANNAH
L. REV. 95, 107 (2017) (describing clinical methods for teaching legal doctrine as “analysis
[that] starts with the client’s goals and moves outward to what legal tools are available in the
doctrine. The availability of a specific legal tool is dependent on the presence of both the
fictional client’s need and the necessary contextual facts.”)
21
Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29418 [hereinafter Experiential Learning
Lab]. The Lawyering Method builds on the multiple intelligence work of researchers such as
Howard Gardner. It presupposes that excellence in law practice requires a range of
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Article is structured with the four Lawyering Method elements as a sort of
exoskeleton: Setting Goals; Interpreting Facts; Interpreting Rules; and
Managing Interactions.22
Thus each of the first four sections of the Article begins by envisioning a
slice of what students are working on for the client problem. For each
Lawyering Element the piece then moves in two parts:
1. First, I use the Lawyering Element comparatively literally. That is, to
consider what this particular class segment requires the studentlawyers to do, and through that work, what students learn about that
element. For each illustrative vignette, this section seeks to elucidate
and deconstruct what the students are doing/learning through their
work.
2. Next, in light of each vignette, I use the Lawyering Element more
conceptually (and to be honest, far more loosely) as a vantage point for
small portions of faculty reflection about the student learning
experience.
To summarize, I ask in turn: What are Goals for this class, and also
overall goals for educating lawyers? What do the Facts tell us about
what we believe developing lawyers must learn, the current realities of
legal pedagogy, and the limitations of time and built-in incentives in
law teaching? What are the core Rules of family law, and of the
social/cultural constructions of family that students encountering the
subject must come away comprehending? Also, what are the internal
and external rules that govern current legal pedagogy, what policies
and assumptions underlie them, and ideally how should they affect our
pedagogy going forward? And finally, what are the nuts and bolts of
how we Manage Interactions among clients, colleagues, and
students, for courses like these? What are the logistics of who does
what in the course? And in a world of limited resources and debates

intellectual, interpersonal and emotional skills. Refinements in defining the Lawyering
Method were developed as a collective effort combining the thinking leading scholars across
an array of disciplines including Anthony G. Amsterdam (law), Jerome Bruner (psychology),
and Carol Gilligan (psychology), as well as dozens of thoughtful participants in the NYU
Lawyering Theory Colloquium and the NYU Lawyering Program Workways pedagogy
working group.
22
I adopt this particular framework because it is uncomplicated, well-considered, and
comparatively indisputable. But its ease can also be misleading: many of these elements
bleed into one another far more than this list implies. That can be seen throughout this Article,
where part of what I consider as “facts” might also be examined through the lens of “goals,”
and so forth. But however imperfect or loosely-metaphorical a structure it provides, having
some form of external organization principle is far more useful than having none.
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about directions for legal education more generally, what are the
ramifications for more widespread use of immersive methodologies?
I. SETTING GOALS
Student A: So, here’s one issue we all seem to be agreed
upon: we’re going to recommend that we represent only
Frankie, not Frankie and Saanvi together. Even if it’s
technically ethical, it seems like there’s too much potential
for conflict of interest, especially with what we know about
their different finances.
Student B: That makes sense.
Student C: Yeah, I agree.
Student A: So if that’s the case, we still need to clarify
what we know and maybe do research to find out more
about what we want to advise Frankie to do in terms of her
relationship with Saanvi.
Student B: But how much research do we really want to
bill Frankie for if it’s simplest and safest for them just to get
married? My bet is that that’s what they’ll end up doing
anyway.
Student C: Fair enough, but we know that Frankie is
still pretty ambivalent about getting married. Shouldn’t we
at least find out more about the kinds of documents they’d
need to get close to the protections they would have from
marriage? At the same time, we also know that it’s more
expensive and time-consuming and might not provide the
same protections in the long run…
Student A (interrupting): Does anyone know what those
documents are or how close they get you? I know I don’t,
and we are going to have to spend some time looking into
it.
Student B: My sense is that that’s Frankie’s decision,
not ours. Let’s present her with the various options and see
which one she goes for.
Student A: And there’s the added complication if they
do end up having children, which she has mentioned to us
more than once. We have to present Frankie with two
scenarios here. One with kids and the other without.
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Student C: So really one decision leads to the next
decision leads to the next. We are going to have to help walk
her through all of them, kind of like a flow chart.
Student A: That makes sense. So let’s make a list of all
the research we need to do and start to divide up the tasks.
A. Students/Lawyers: Understanding their Roles and Goals
So far, so good. Our student-lawyers seem to understand that they cannot
begin their work without a plan, and they seem roughly to have formulated
one. They have actually accomplished quite a complicated array of lawyering
tasks pretty efficiently, so it will be helpful to unpack them.23
The student-lawyers’ first objective was to determine whom to represent.
This predicate question raises immediate issues of professional ethics, values
and interests.24 To reach the conclusion they do, the students must have read
Rule 1.7 on conflicts of interest25 and they should have considered
commentary from family law practitioners about collective vs. individual
representation.26 They had to weigh the possibility of diverging interests
between their proposed clients Frankie and Saanvi against the added
inconvenience and expense for the couple of having each party represented
separately.
The students’ choice to represent only Frankie is probably a wise one, and
will merit further exploration in class. Both partners may have
complementary goals for the moment, but there is no guarantee that that will
always remain true: families are complicated, and on any number of issues
what’s good for one partner may not remain equally advantageous for the
other. It is not uncommon, though, for couples in the giddy throes of romance
to have a difficult time envisioning a future that includes familial conflict,
which is precisely why it is part of the family lawyer’s job to introduce the

23

Though the examination that follows just scratches the surface.
Thus also immediately intertwining the ethical and professional exploration with
doctrinal learning.
25
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONFLICT, Rule 1.7:
Conflict
of
Interest:
Current
Clients,
available
at
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_
of_professional_conduct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_interest_current_clients/.
26
See Nancy R. Schembri, Prenuptial Agreements and the Significance of Independent
Counsel, 17 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 313 (2003). See also, Steven H. Hobbs, Family
Matters: Non-Waivable Conflicts of Interest in Family Law, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 57
(1998) (considering matters in which representation cannot or should not be joint); but cf.,
Elizabeth Carter, Rethinking Premarital Agreements: A Collaborative Approach, 46 N. MEX.
L. REV. 354 (2016) (arguing forcefully in favor of collaborative premarital contracts in which
intended spouses retain shared counsel).
24
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possibility.27 Already, our student-lawyers are confronting the extent to
which sensitive and very emotional factors intersect with doctrinal ones in
family law—perhaps not entirely distinctly from the way similar questions
arise in other areas of law, but unusually pervasively and prominently in
family representation.28
With the matter of who they will represent resolved, our student-lawyers
move onto their client’s primary presenting question: what are the legal
consequences if she weds her partner, and what legal protections could her
family avail itself of if they choose not to marry? To consider the dimensions
of this question the student-lawyers will have to work on “goal setting” both
with respect to clarifying the client’s objectives and to their own work plans.
Let’s briefly consider each in turn.
From the short dialogue excerpted in our vignette it is not immediately
apparent exactly what the client’s goals are. We know she is undecided about
getting married (do we really know why? does she?).29 Is she seeking legal
information to guide her in making what is ultimately an intensely personal
decision? Is one of the partners more inclined toward marriage than the other
and hoping that legal counsel will be persuasive in a given direction? Or is
this perhaps instead a purely pragmatic inquiry for Frankie, to figure out from
a legal perspective exactly what benefits, privileges, and obligations marriage
transmits so she can make a more informed decision?30 How does the
possibility of introducing a child into the family factor in? To put a finer point
on it, is the client’s goal purely gathering information from her lawyers, or
does she want guidance and possibly additional legal work in order to secure
the maximum possible legal protection for herself and her family?
27

See Christine Fletcher, 10 Things You Need to Know About Prenups, FORBES (Sep.
18, 2018) available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/christinefletcher/2018/09/18/10-thingsyou-need-to-know-about-prenups/#2118bc9662ba (urging readers to “hope for the best, but
plan for the worst”).
28
A point frequently made in casebook-driven family law courses as well. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, NAOMI R. CAHN, CATHERINE J. ROSS, DAVID D. MAYER & LINDA C.
MCCLAIN, CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW 3 (4th ed. 2015) (pointing out to family law
students that the subject is “rich in human challenges and emotions”). But perhaps not quite
so viscerally encountered by its students?
29
This is one of the places where Davis and Davenport’s insightful decision to set the
simulation in the context especially pays off. In theory any couple could be asking such
questions about whether they would or should get married. Yet it makes far more sense for
a lesbian couple living in a time when same-sex marriage has only recently become
universally available in the U.S. to be unusually thoughtful about marriage’s ramifications.
30
Analyzing the impact of the Defense of Marriage Act prohibiting federal recognition
of same-sex marriages, the Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) identified 1138
statutory provisions in the United States Code that accorded rights and privileges on the basis
of marital status. Defense of Marriage Act: Update to the 1997 Report – 2004, available at
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04353r.pdf.
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At this point the student-lawyers do not necessarily know the answers to
those questions,31 but already they know enough to begin to think about them.
It is suggestive that Frankie is asking these questions of an attorney in the
first place. After all, how frequent is it that a key stop for long-term
committed partners deciding whether to marry involves extended
consultation with lawyers? The students may conclude that this decision by
the client is a simulation artificiality introduced to provide an opportunity for
them to explore the question: why legal marriage? I would nevertheless invite
them to respond realistically to everything in their simulation,32 and to try to
use the oddness of the circumstances to complicate or sharpen their
understanding of their client’s goals. Here that query could lead the students
to be somewhat skeptical of their client’s actual desire for marriage. It could
also lead to an examination of the client’s specific social context. Her lawyers
know that she has come of age in a world where legal marriage was not an
available option for her relationship.33 They might be prompted to want to
learn more about Frankie’s hesitancy, and whether the recent(ish) legalization
of same-sex marriage has some personal, familial, or cultural implications for
Frankie that they are not fully aware of.34 That inquiry in turn might be
helpful in aiding Frankie to further clarify and then meet her goals in
consulting her attorneys.
Notice, then, that on the client’s behalf our student-lawyers’ careful
attention to her goals neatly epitomizes the description of the goal-setting
element as elucidated in the Lawyering Method, which affirms that lawyers
“must hear or propose explicit goals, identify implicit goals, and balance both
31

It may be that Frankie is not fully certain herself.
My practice in simulation teaching is never to change what “clients” (often outside
volunteers or paid actors) say or do, but instead to try to find a way to understand their
conduct as part of their characters. Students sometimes comment on the effectiveness of
those “playing” their clients, which usually prompts me to look slightly puzzled and profess
not to be acquainted with the word “actor.” But even this fairly rigid approach to realism still
leaves room for faculty intervention when needed. We can always use in-role devices like
faculty-drafted emails from clients, etc. to add or correct facts that are crucial to the students’
progress in the case.
33
A history which led to a great deal of confusion about the legal status of pre-Obergefell
same-sex relationships. See Michael J. Higdon, While They Waited: Pre-Obergefell Lives
and the Law of Nonmarriage, 128 YALE L. J. FORUM, 1 (2019).
34
As the students will learn, Frankie is in fact experiencing a good deal of resistance to
the “institutionalizing” of her relationship. Some of it stems from feminist critique of
marriage itself, and some from an unwillingness to grant what has traditionally been a hostile
state the power to define the private relationship she cherishes. For background underlying
such considerations see Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, 6
OUT/LOOK 14, (1989); Katherine Franke, Same-Sex Marriage is a Mixed Blessing, NY
TIMES,
June
23,
2011,
available
at
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html?mtrref=www.google.com&g
wh=0B7DB08E40BF752B6DCF9FA9D119DC7F&gwt.
32
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against judgments about the [client’s] interests….”35
Notice, too, that the vignette leaves off at exactly the point where the
student-lawyers begin to establish goals for their own work on this portion of
the case. Presumably in the next segment of their conversation the studentlawyers will distill what they need to find out, and then they will begin their
research. The effectiveness of that research can be evaluated in the next
section of the course when the students will meet with Frankie to review her
options. And both the efficacy and efficiency of the research goals and paths
will be subject to critical examination, consistent with immersion
methodology.36
Having identified several possible client objectives and determined that
they will treat them essentially as options along a decision tree that they will
present when they next meet with their client, our student-lawyers begin to
enumerate their research tasks. The student-lawyers’ “flowchart” idea is a
rather astute plan. It shows a genuinely sophisticated understanding of the
counseling work they are preparing for, in that they seem to grasp the
contingent nature of client decision-making.37 The students also seem
intuitively to discern that they can best help their client make a decision about
marriage—her stated primary goal—by outlining both best- and worst-case
protections for the client’s family in marital and non-marital scenarios.38 That
perception in turn branches into their plans for further investigation of the
kinds of private documents attorneys can provide to their clients to afford at
least some of the protections automatically conferred by marriage.39
Family law practitioners and professors would further be pleased to see
that these students immediately comprehend how much the marriage/not
35

Experiential Learning Lab supra note ___.
One of the benefits of an experiential immersion course is that researchers can pretty
easily identify the successes and breakdowns in their research goals when they turn to use
what they have found. In addition to evaluating their efficacy in setting their research goals
I further ask students to look critically at their own efficiency in finding the information they
sought. Repeating those two lines of critique—completeness and time investment—for all
research work in the course helps delineate for students what the broad goals of research
should always be. It also helps them teach themselves to refine their research paths within
family law-specific material.
37
See Alexander Scherr, Lawyers and Decisions: A Model of Practical Judgment, 47
VILL. L. REV. 161, 265-69 (2002) (considering the professional anxiety lawyers may
experience from the limitations of their advisory roles, and “not having the final say in legal
decisions” that they must in the end leave up to their clients).
38
Meaning that they will have to look closely at questions of who can marry whom and
by what means, as well as what marriage permits and what it requires. This should lead them
next to study such issues as financial support obligations within marriage, property
ownership status, healthcare access and determination, legal expectations (or not) of fidelity,
39
Meaning that they will have to learn something about common estate-planning
instruments such as powers of attorney, health proxies, and designations of conservatorship.
36
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decision changes with the possibility of children. This is true both because
the issues become more complicated40 and the stakes may become so much
higher.41 Most practitioners would probably also be delighted to have their
junior lawyers be at least passingly aware of billing matters and
proportionality in regard to legal work.
So our vignette suggests that the students have a lot on their plates even
in this beginning stage of the simulation. But so far they do seem eager and
equipped to handle it.
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Establishing Achievable Goals for
Integrated Learning
What are the educational goals of this introductory segment of the
immersion family law course?
Well first, to learn some family law.42
In all of our immersive family law courses this means developing a core
understanding of the rules of law pertaining to the clients’ problems. Since
my course is intended as an introduction to family equivalent to a more
traditionally-taught casebook courses it additionally means that the legal
principles studied should be consistent with those usually learned in any
standard family law class. In an immersion class, though, we do mean “learn
law” far more multi-dimensionally than may be true in traditional casebook
courses. Yet we firmly believe that students also leave the class with at least
as solid an understanding of the legal principles they have studied as they
would have gained in a casebook-driven class.
For this proposition we can turn to the reflections on experiential learning
that abound in the legal pedagogy literature.43 To support the notion that
learning by doing helps students master fundamental concepts we can turn to
Particularly given the biological reality that in the lesbian client’s scenario no child
will be the direct biological descendant of both parents, which inevitably raises a host of
legal issues pertaining either to assisted reproduction or to adoption. See Elizabeth A. Harris,
Same-Sex Parents Still Face Legal Complications, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2017, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/us/gay-pride-lgbtq-same-sex-parents.html.
41
Kris Franklin, “A Family Like Any Other Family:” Alternative Methods of Defining
Family in Law, 18 REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027, 1073-76 (1990-91) (considering
nontraditional means of providing legal recognition for familial ties, and concluding that
workable schemes were far more straightforward to construct for relations among adults than
between adults and their children).
42
Because at least my own version of Family Law in Practice is intended to be a
reasonably comprehensive survey of common family law doctrine, I will have to ensure that
students encounter in broad strokes most of the topics generally introduced in a basic family
law course. Discussed further infra at ___.
43
See Jennifer E. Spreng, Spirals and Schemas: How Integrated Courses in Law School
Create Higher-Order Thinkers and Problem Solvers, 37 U. LAVERNE L. REV. 37, 43-50
(2015).
40
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other scholars’ examinations of the embedded learning in other disciplines:
Bob Moses’s concretized teaching of positive and negative numbers by riding
public transit, for example,44 or Aaron Pallas’s introduction to statistics
methodology through group exploration of what it truly means for a number
to be in the “middle” of a data set.45
This kind of learning embodies what educational theorist Eleanor
Duckworth deems “critical exploration.”46 Duckworth’s own research is
centered in primary education, and she grounds her theories in the earlier
thinking of Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder.47 Through examples of puzzles
and projects that enable children to explore science, mathematics, spelling,
and other basic educational topics, though, her work is universalized beyond
child development. Moreover it neatly anticipates the kinds of learning that
adult law students do in immersion courses. As Duckworth relates, she is
“convinced that people must construct their own knowledge and must
assimilate new experiences in ways that make sense to them…. [M]ore often
than not, simply telling students what we want them to know leaves them
cold.”48 Duckworth’s observation helps make it clear exactly why
immersion—designed learning by doing—permits “learning law” much more
meaningfully than casebook courses typically foster. The student-lawyers’
empathy for their clients, and simultaneous interest in their own experience
working on the problems the clients present, give abstract operation of legal
rules real context in precisely the way that Socratic hypotheticals aim for49
but too rarely achieve.50
44

Detailed at length in ROBERT P. MOSES & CHARLES E. COBB, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS FROM
MISSISSIPPI TO THE ALGEBRA PROJECT (2002).
45
PALLAS, AARON M., & ANNA NEUMANN, CONVERGENT TEACHING: TOOLS TO SPARK
DEEPER LEARNING IN COLLEGE 69-77 (2019) [hereinafter CONVERGENT TEACHING]. For
further examples see Mary Kay Delany’s introduction to epistemology in high school social
studies through examination of policies and perceptions of President Ronald Reagan.
Understanding the Presidency, in “TELL ME MORE”: LISTENING TO LEARNERS EXPLAIN, 125
(Eleanor Duckworth, ed. 1987).
46
ELEANOR DUCKWORTH, “THE HAVING OF WONDERFUL IDEAS” AND OTHER ESSAYS
ON TEACHING AND LEARNING, 140 (2006).
47
Id. at 1-5, 15-16, 38-40.
48
Id. at 173.
49
For a thoughtful endorsement of the continuing value of well-considered Socratic case
dialogue see Michal T. Gibson, A Critique of Best Practices in Legal Education: Five Things
All Law Professors Should Know, 42 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 30-61 (2012).
50
Especially for all students equally. The nature of Socratic dialogue as it usually
functions in the casebook law classroom tends to involve a solitary interlocutor conversing
with one or only a very few students at a time. In theory all other students/observers are
thoroughly engaged in critically considering both sides of this discourse, but it seems
doubtful that those who are not part of the exchange remain attentively and fully engrossed
at every moment. Jeremiah A. Ho, Function, Form, and Strawberries: Subverting Langdell,
64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 656, 658-70 (2015).
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Current learning theory may provide additional explanation for the
unique value of immersive learning: it is frankly more complicated and more
challenging. Scholars can debate the merits of complexity at various points
in educational curricula (they have!),51 but there is little doubt that if we want
to teach complicated things (we do!)52 at some point or other we will need to
teach things in a way that is… complicated. With respect to retention of
material learned53 psychologists even have a name for the effect of what they
call “desirable difficulty.”54 We know that the harder human brains work to
retrieve information the more strongly it is stored, and the more effortlessly
it is retrieved later on.55 It accordingly makes sense that so-called “effortful”
learning has been found to be less superficial and more long-lasting.56 So if
learning of legal doctrine takes place in an immersive setting, and the
immersion experience is more demanding, the body of current learning
science should suggest at the very least that mastery of the rules should be
more complete and more long-lasting.
Some may wonder whether learning legal rules by immersion actually is
harder than learning them in casebook courses.57 When it comes to the kind
of curated experiences fictionalized in simulations, writers have suggested

51

See COMPLEXITY IN EDUCATION: FROM HORROR TO PASSION (Cok Bakker & Nicolina
Montesano Montessori, eds. 2016).
52
All law teachers must impart deep knowledge of intricate legal rules and exceptions,
all while we are concurrently and always aiming to further refine the ineffable complexities
of “thinking like a lawyer.”
53
Which differs from initial mastery of concepts and skills, but is of course closely
adjacent.
54
Robert A. Bjork & Elizabeth Ligon Bjork, A New Theory of Disuse and an Old Theory
of Stimulus Fluctuation, in 2 FROM LEARNING PROCESSES TO COGNITIVE PROCESSES 35
(Alice F. Healy et al., eds., 1992).
55
See generally, PETER C. BROWN, HENRY L. ROEDIGER III & MARK A. MCDANIEL,
MAKE IT STICK: THE SCIENCE OF SUCCESSFUL LEARNING 67-101 (2014) (urging that for
greater learning we should “embrace difficulties” and that “easier isn’t better”).
56
Elizabeth Ligon Bjork & Robert A. Bjork, Making Things Hard on Yourself, But in a
Good Way: Creating Desirable Difficulties to Enhance Learning, in PSYCHOLOGY AND THE
REAL WORLD: ESSAYS ILLUSTRATING FUNDAMENTAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIETY 56
(Morton Ann Gernsbacher et al., eds., 2009)
57
And I suppose some might suggest that the stress of traditional cold-calling in many
casebook-driven law classes is itself difficult. I’m quite sure it is, but I doubt that is precisely
the kind of difficulty that the researchers had in mind for enhancing comprehension and
recall.
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that they tend to be “simpler”58 or at least insufficiently “messy.”59 I do not
agree that simulations by their very nature must be comparatively
uncomplicated.60 Quite the contrary, in fact, in the sense that they bring
together so many dimensions of what we mean by “law.” And when
considering only the narrow category of learning established black letter
rules, it is hard to see how there can be substantial variation in difficulty
whether those rules are learned in practical context rather compared to a more
traditional case reading.
But even though learning legal doctrine is absolutely central to the
overarching goal to “learn some family law,” what we mean by that is also
more ambitious than just mastery of statutes, cases, or concepts. Legal
doctrine does not exist for its own sake—it is developed in the context of real
human problems. Understanding how the law operates for the people who
encounter it is part of truly comprehending what it is, and why it is that way.
That’s how law students and lawyers move from “knowing” the law (being
able to recap legal principles) to thoroughly knowing it (having thought
deeply enough about legal principles to exercise good judgment about when
they apply and predict how they might shift in new circumstances).
Moreover, immersion teachers and our students include within the
“learning law” umbrella a family-law-specific examination of client
interviewing, counseling, research, advocacy, ethical questions and values
inquiries, along with the rest of the extended list of the professional
undertakings of lawyers. In so doing, we also take on the many goals of
experiential education enumerated by Deborah Maranville and her
colleagues: understanding unequal social structures, advancing social justice,
developing lawyering skills, cultivating professional identity, fostering
professional ethics, providing culturally competent client representation to a
diverse array of clients, developing sound judgment and problem-solving
58
See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, Simulations: An Introduction, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 469 470
(1995) (characterizing simulations as “more complex than doctrinal hypos, but lacking the
intense reality of a live-client experience”), or Myths and Misconceptions, supra note ___ at
32 (contending that simulations “necessarily simplify the factual and interpersonal
complexity of actual lawyering). See also Margaret Moore Jackson, From Seminar to
Simulation: Wading Out to the Third Wave, 19 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 127, 138-39 (2016)
(describing “what simulation teaching may do less well”).
59
Comments attributed to Dean Erwin Chermerinsky of U.C. Irvine, quoted in No More
Casebooks, supra note ___ at 706.
60
It certainly helps in creating rich and deeply realistically complex characters and
situations to have the unique contributions of a talented playwright like Danielle Davenport.
Legal educators could probably gain a lot from more widespread cross-pollination with
creative disciplines. Yet as enormously valuable as Davenport’s collaboration was for our
particular immersion courses, I do not think finding non-legal contributors is a sine qua non,
and the absence of such a collaborator should not be a barrier to immersion for law professors
working on their own.
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abilities, gaining insight into law and the legal system, promoting lifelong
learning, and learning to work collaboratively.61 In short, our goal of learning
law is as expansive as the meaning of the word itself.
One immediate example is the student-lawyers’ insight into the
“flowchart nature” of their impending client counseling session that I have
already praised. An overarching goal of legal education is helping law
students understand and develop skills for their role in helping clients solve
problems.62 The progressive nature of the various decisions their client will
have to make and the information she needs to make her choices almost force
the student-lawyers to become more thoughtful about the interrelationship
between legal information and client decision-making. One goal down, and
certainly plenty of other examples can be found.
Once we have established “learning some family law” in an intricate and
multi-faceted way as our encompassing teaching objective, it may be helpful
to consider some of the logistical details involved in trying to meet those
objectives.
We find that many of our approaches are consistent with those outlined
by other law teachers reflecting on their simulation-based coursework, so
there is no need to rehash what has been amply communicated by so many
colleagues. Instead then, I outline here several of the operational decisions
that seem not to have been adopted by others, or are at least not fleshed out
in other published works.
The first is the strategic use of structured team-based research
assignments. In my course students organize themselves into teams of three
or at most four student-lawyers, and once the teams are formed they are
chunked into groupings designated A, B and C.63 It is not unusual in
experiential law classes to have students work in teams (often dubbed “law

61

Deborah Maranville, Mary A. Lynch, Susan L. Kay, Phyllis Goldfarb & Russell
Engler, Re-Vision Quest: A Law School Guide to Designing Experiential Courses Involving
Real Lawyering, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 517, 527 (2011/2012).
62
A prodigious volume of writing directed at law students, and about the profession
generally, focuses on the modern attorney’s primary responsibility to serve as a “problem
solver” for clients. For just one prominent example, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When
Winning Isn’t Everything, the Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000).
Perhaps this also explains the common law school graduation gift of a mug emblazoned with
Lawyer: Because Badass Problem Solver is not an Official Job Title.
63
The idea of dividing teams into groupings and assigning differing preparations
emphases was originated by Peggy Cooper Davis in her version of the course. My specific
research assignments and focuses diverge from hers due to the differing nature of our
courses, but I was happy to adopt her effective and efficient approach.
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firms”64). And there are tremendous advantages to learning in teams,65 not
the least of which is that knowing how to work collaboratively has frequently
been identified as a crucial skill within the legal profession and beyond.66
An innovation in our particular immersion classes is to use the differing
letter designations to manage workload and to more comprehensively
exemplify the kinds of inquiries expected of attorneys by frequently posing
differing—albeit
occasionally
overlapping—research
preparation
assignments to differently-lettered teams. For example, after meeting the
client and planning their work as shown in our vignette, my own students
would begin with some background reading that the partner in their firm
would provide (e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges67) and would then consider a more
focused question depending on their team’s designation, such as:
A. Who is eligible to be married in our state, and what procedures does
the jurisdiction require?
B. Does our state recognize domestic partnerships, and if so how are they
similar to or dissimilar from legal marriage?
C. What is common law marriage, does our state recognize it, and is there
any possibility our client already has one?
In class meetings, student teams can report on their own research, ensure that
their findings and analysis were consistent with other teams sharing their
letter designation, and ask questions of groups that focused in other areas.
Divvying up the questions this way serves one faculty goal of ensuring that
all of these topics are considered, and another faculty goal of exposing all
students to many topics without ending up spending too much time on any
64

E.g. No More Casebooks, supra note ___ at 702. Forming student working groups
called law firms is a pretty widespread practice in many classrooms. See, e.g., Robert G.
Vaugh, Use of Simulations in a First-year Civil Procedure Class, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 480,
481 91995); Lloyd B. Snyder, Teaching Students How to Practice Law: A Simulation Course
in Pretrial Practice, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 513, 515 (1995).
65
In fact, there are well-developed theories of best practices for team-based learning that
have been employed in other disciplines for decades, and used effective in law classrooms
for some time. See Sophie M. Sparrow & Margaret Sova McCabe, Team-Based learning in
Law, 18 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 153 (2012). Since it has a different structure and design I
cannot claim that my course fully follows all of the systems identified as components for
effective “team-based learning.” Perhaps, then, that designation does not fully fit the
pedagogy of my class. Nonetheless our objectives and procedures are similar (and I hope
complementary) so whether or not Family Law in Practice is considered a “team-based
learning course,” it is certain that there is significant learning both within and about
functioning professional teams.
66
See BEST PRACTICES, supra note ___ at 77; Sophie M. Sparrow, Can They Work Well
on a Team?, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1162, 1162-64 (2012) (considering the strong desire
in the legal profession for law graduates who are well-prepared to function as effective team
members).
67
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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one of them.68 Since several teams share the same letter designation and
therefore the same assignments they can compare their work with others, so
that collectively the class has achieved some specialization, coverage, and
contrast for self-critique, all without unhelpful duplication of student effort.
Yet another difference from most casebook courses (and many clinical
ones) is my insistence that students reflect explicitly and critically on their
research paths.69 Self-reflection is quite naturally a key component of any
immersive learning. It may be the singular hallmark of what law professors
consider “clinical method.”70 It is therefore frequent in clinical education that
students are asked to be thoughtfully reflective about their lawyering
interactions such as meetings with clients or witnesses, their appearances in
court or at hearings, and so on. But there are fewer opportunities in law school
for budding lawyers to turn their attention directly to surveying and
improving their own research work and learning processes. That’s a shame.
An entire body of literature on the value of metacognition suggests that the
more students are conscious of how they are learning, the more effective
learners they will become.71
II. INTERPRETING FACTS
Student B: That was a really productive meeting with
Frankie!
Student C: Yeah, I feel like we have a much clearer
direction to go in now.
Student A (jumping in): Sure, we have a better sense of
what our tasks are and what she is saying she would want.
I mean, obviously we’re going to need to know a lot more
about property ownership, mortgages, taxes, and so on. But
did anyone else feel like Frankie wasn’t being superrealistic about the financial considerations in their
relationship? It seemed to me Frankie had a hard time
68

Even though this particular example does not show it, it is common for one of the preassigned questions to be about lawyering process, such as “How should an excellent attorney
conduct this initial client meeting?” That meets the dual goals of creating an opportunity to
be explicit in learning/reviewing key lawyering skills, and of making that project seem equal
in significance to learning about the legal rules governing the problem. It is my habit to rotate
letter assignments so that the more process-oriented questions move around to differentlydesignated teams.
69
Discussed supra, note ___ and accompanying text.
70
CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note ___ at 23-24.
71
See, generally, HOW PEOPLE LEARN, supra note ____ at 47-48; MICHAEL HUNTER
SCHWARTZ & PAULA J. MANNING, EXPERT LEARNING FOR LAW STUDENTS (3d ed. 2018)
(applying metacognitive techniques to law student learning).
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acknowledging quite how dependent their lives are on
Saanvi’s income and assets, which are so much greater
than hers.
Student C: That’s true. I think she doesn’t think about—
or doesn’t want to think about—how much their
comparative finances have changed. She was fine sharing
expenses early in their relationship when she had more
money but neither of them had very much, but now that
Saanvi has a lot of money it seems like she is more reluctant
to consider everything they have as joint.
Student B: I actually really admire Frankie for wanting
to feel like Saanvi’s financial equal, but it’s scaring me in
terms of writing a prenup.
Student A: Yes. I am certainly glad we’re the ones
writing the first draft, not Saanvi’s lawyers! But I feel pretty
torn here between our obligations to look out for Frankie’s
best interests, and on the other hand to draft this document
the way she has suggested she wants.
Student C: I know! Frankie’s not necessarily looking
out for her own best interests.
Student A: Do you think she was thinking aloud, or that
she definitely meant what she said about all of the stuff
that’s in Saanvi’s name staying that way? My sense is that
without a premarital agreement, if they were to get
divorced somewhere down the line Frankie would be
entitled to a lot more. I don’t think she has really thought
through what it would be like if they ever broke up.
Student C: We’d have to know a lot more about what a
divorce would look like in our state without a prenup, and
how stuff would get divided, before we can think through
the options and terms we should present to Frankie.
Student B: By the way, have either of you drafted a
prenup before? I know I haven’t, and I don’t really know
where to start.
A. Students/Lawyers: Defining Facts Needed to Complete a Task
From this new vignette it is apparent that our student-lawyers are now
presented with a clearly defined lawyering task. We learn that they are
preparing to draft a prenuptial agreement, which suggests that the client has

20

Method Lawyering

[27-Feb-20

decided to legally marry.72 The vignette also establishes that the partners,
probably acting wisely upon advice of counsel, plan to consider ways to
address some significant differences in their assets and income before they
wed.
The next steps for the student-lawyers would seem to be:
1. Finding out as much as possible about both Frankie’s and Saanvi’s
current earnings and property;
2. Learning more about both partners’ careers, investments and family
backgrounds, so that to the extent possible their individual and joint
assets can be projected to the future;
3. Gathering information about wealth- and estate- planning, including
how federal and state taxation would treat the family currently and
whether there are more advantageous ways for them to structure
their money;
4. Familiarizing themselves with the marital property dissolution
scheme in their state to contrast it with whatever premarital
agreement(s) might be on the table;
5. Drafting a prenuptial contract that would protect Frankie’s economic
interests in the case of a divorce; and finally,
6. Presenting that draft agreement (or perhaps several alternative
approaches to a possible agreement) to Frankie in a meeting in
which the attorneys explain their concerns about her financial
security and then seek to implement her decisions.
Steps 3 and 4 fall squarely within the category of understanding and using
legal rules, step 6 pretty clearly involves a great deal of “managing
interactions,” and step 5 probably combines the two. This segment of the
Article concerns itself primarily with the fact-gathering required to begin the
work at hand.
So exactly what facts do the student-lawyers need to perform their work,
and how will they get them? Legal work is always intensely fact-bound, but
in what ways—and where those facts come from—can differ enormously.73
Advocacy settings, for example, pose the unique complexity of necessitating
both the most objective read available and the ultimate need for creative
structuring of the most favorable slant possible in the circumstances.74 For
72
Lawyers for Frankie should at least consider the outside possibility that both the client
and her partner could be using the term “pre-nuptial” colloquially, and that they are seeking
a relationship contract but have no immediate plans to legally wed. But that seems unlikely,
and it is probably safe to assume that Frankie and Saanvi want to get married.
73
See W. Bradley Wendel, Whose Truth? Objective and Subjective Perspectives on
Truthfulness in Advocacy, 28 YALE J. LAW & HUM. 105 (2016).
74
As the Lawyering Elements explain, interpreting facts is rarely a simple matter, “for
facts are rarely certain and always subject to varying interpretations.” Experiential Learning
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less-contested legal work75 like the planning documents sought here the
assembling of facts may be more linear, but it is never effortless. Because the
matters we handle are always personally consequential, lawyers must work
tirelessly to collect as much information about their clients’ circumstances as
they can.76
For crafting a prenuptial contract, the facts our family lawyers need to
work with will almost all be based within their client’s financial realities.77
Personal issues are hard. And money questions are especially personal,
therefore especially hard to talk about. We learn in the vignette that the
student-lawyers have discovered there is a considerable disparity between
their clients’ fortune and her partner’s. As well as, apparently, some
touchiness around her feelings of dependency. This could make the fact
gathering required in this situation unusually thorny. The student-lawyers
will have to be thoughtful about what information they need and where they
will get it, as well as being careful about how they deliver their inquiries.
Their first steps should be to go beyond the descriptive information
available from conversations with their client and to seek to review as much
documentary evidence as they can reasonably78 obtain. That can provide
more concrete and indisputable information than would be obtained orally,
while simultaneously helping to circumvent the awkwardness of asking some
questions in person. They may want to ask for bank statements, copies of W2s or tax returns, mortgage papers, and so on.
What’s particularly complicated is that it would be very helpful to see
such materials for both Frankie and Saanvi. Yet not only is Saanvi not their
client, she is represented by separate counsel. The student-lawyers now have
both a client to gather information from79 and someone who is essentially a
Lab, supra note ___. See also § 13.4 Developing a Unifying Theme in STEFAN H. KRIEGER
& RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR., ESSENTIAL LAWYERING SKILLS 174-83 (4th ed. 2011 but
probably not the most recent).
75
One important distinction between legal counsel and advice from other kinds of
professionals is that lawyers are trained always to operate within the shadow of potential
litigation. Even in purely transactional work, lawyers are often taught to anticipate and
mitigate risk in the eventuality of partnerships not working out. See STEPHEN L. SEPINUCK
& JOHN FRANCIS HILSON, TRANSACTIONAL SKILLS: HOW TO STRUCTURE AND DOCUMENT A
DEAL 6-11 (2015).
76
As Mary Pat Treuthart exemplifies, teachers of family law courses routinely
emphasize “the importance of listening, really listening, to what the client is saying, and not
saying.” A Perspective on Teaching and Learning Family Law, 75 UMKC L. REV. 1047,
1051 (2007).
77
GARY N. SKOLOFF, RICHARD H. SINGER, JR. & RONALD L. BROWN, DRAFTING
PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS, (2019 supp.).
78
“Reasonable” meaning without being too intrusive, and without incurring
unwarranted attorneys’ fees in the process.
79
Susan L. Turley contends that lawyers should always see interviewing clients (and
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third-party (at least to their representation)80 that they need to consult with.
All while respecting that in seeking the information they need, they are
wading into private matters between life partners. The attorneys will have to
be savvy about assessing their priorities, and then they’ll need to decide from
whom and how they should ask for those materials.81
Now, assume for the moment that our student-lawyers were wildly
successful in that project and somehow magically obtained every single piece
of paper that they could possibly wish to get their hands on, and that they
meticulously pored through them. Would they then have all the facts they
needed? Hardly. At best this would only provide a slice of the present facts.
Even those may be unclear or subject to interpretation.82 Drafting planning
documents like prenuptial agreements entails understanding the facts when
the contract becomes operative—i.e., at some undetermined possible point in
the future. Future “facts” are not actually facts, they are speculation of
possible scenarios that may unfold. But they are also the contingencies upon
which the legal analysis to be done now (legal reasoning being at base the
application of rules to facts), hinges. Or to put it differently, the efficacy of
our lawyers’ current drafting project depends on what the facts will become.
Those can be anticipated but cannot yet be actually known.
For our student-lawyers, planning in this way will help solidify their grasp
of the imaginative process that is so often a part of legal work with facts.
Sometimes that imagination leads to creative avenues of investigation.83
Sometimes it involves envisioning what is not currently established but might
be true and then asking questions or collecting evidence to find out whether
it actually is. Other times, as here, it involves wading into the vast chasm of
uncertainty that lawyers’ greatest challenge is to manage.84 In many practice
others) as a key tool of research for lawyers. I completely agree. “To See Between”:
Interviewing as Legal Research Tool, 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 283 (2010).
80
Experts in interviewing emphasize the importance of “parallel universe” thinking
when seeking to elicit information through conversation. See CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra
note ___ at 258-59.
81
Raising interesting complexities in managing interactions, and thus exposing how
interconnected and overlapping the various Lawyering Elements actually are. Supra note
____.
82
ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW, 7 (2000).
83
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Problem Solving and
Teachable in Legal Education?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (2001). This is also undoubtedly
why a law school text devoted to interviewing and counseling skills so heavily stresses
maintaining an open perspective when working with clients. STEPHEN ELLMANN, et al.
LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 16-17 (2009).
84
CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note ___, at 19-21, positions “improving capacities to
manage uncertainty” as a central component of the third goal of all legal clinical education.
See also ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO THINK LIKE A
LAWYER, 66-67 (2007) (observing the “epistemological uncertainty” in which law students
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circumstances, treating things that are not actually factual as contingent but
potential “facts” is a necessary component of lawyers’ thinking. Within a
cautious profession predicated on trying to be correct, handling uncertainly
is probably one of the hardest things new lawyers need to learn.85
Nevertheless, our role as counselors-at-law frequently obliges us to give the
best advice we can even about uncertain prospects. In short, to help clients
manage a never-entirely-knowable present and a changeable future.
Turning back to the reality that they will probably never have every single
piece of evidence they could ever hope to obtain,86 the next key question for
our student-lawyers will be: how will they know when they have done enough
gathering and interpreting the facts in their case? Professors teaching students
to conduct legal research frequently stress the need to find some ending
point.87 The difficulty of deciding that enough is enough extends equally to
factual research. Lawyers need to become comfortable with probably
overshooting their research targets to the point of repetition or diminishing
returns just to ensure relative completeness, while also aiming to do so with
as much economy of time as possible. That requires training and experience,
which our student-lawyers are happily beginning to accrue.
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Considering the Factual Context for
Developing and Teaching an Immersive Course
What are the “facts” of a sound legal education? That is to say, given an
expectation of lifelong learning and refining expertise, what is it that we in
the profession believe law graduates and new lawyers must have learned?
Clearly there is no single definitively-accepted answer to that question,
hence the endless debates within the academy about curriculum, skills and
values training, or subject matter knowledge—as well as the ongoing calls
for transformational change that the Carnegie Report88 and so many law
begin to understand what attorneys mean by “facts.”).
85
See, for example, the extended dialogue intended to illustrate for law students the
challenge and importance of operating in a “world full of wicked ‘whiches’” in RICHARD
MICHAEL FISCHL & JEREMEY PAUL, GETTING TO MAYBE: HOW TO EXCEL ON LAW SCHOOL
EXAMS, 109-16 (1999).
86
Really, how would they ever be able to know that for sure even if they did?
87
Major legal research texts uniformly include advice on when to keep going and at
what point to stop. See, e.g., AMY E. SLOAN, BASIC LEGAL RESEARCH: TOOLS AND
STRATEGIES, ___ (7th ed. 2018) (on “deciding when to stop”); CHRISTINA L. KUNZ, et al.,
THE PROCESS OF LEGAL RESEARCH, 10 (8th ed. 2012) (on “stopping”).
88
Published as WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, ANN COLBY, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, LLOYD
BOND & LEE S. SHULMAN, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF
LAW (2007) [hereinafter, CARNEGIE REPORT]. Prior to that, related propositions about the
need for at least som reform in legal education methods was put for the in the MacCrate
Report. REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING
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school critics recommend. As has already been noted, though, we do all seem
to reconcile into a general concurrence that practice-ready law graduates must
have a complementary balance of a basic knowledge of legal rules, sharp
analytical skills, and meaningful introduction to many and varied tasks of the
profession like reading, researching, writing, advocating, speaking
persuasively, and working effectively both with other professionals and with
clients.
Our vignette helps illustrate that immersive learning of legal doctrine
embedded in context readily combines all of those components of preparing
for a legal career.89 Our student-lawyers have not yet studied the rules that
govern the financial decisions their client must make, but they themselves
recognize that they must learn about “property ownership, mortgages, taxes,
and so on,” as well as finding out about the marital property division rules
operating in their state. Moreover, they seem to treat that legal knowledge in
precisely the way law professors would want them to: as required baseline
information which must then be applied to a specific factual context (that is,
Frankie’s).
It is not inconsequential, though, that these students have essentially
assigned themselves the project of mastering this sometimes-dense material.
A significant body of research shows that feelings of personal agency and
autonomy can enhance learning.90 Further work suggests the most common
learning modes in traditional law school classes may interfere with student
autonomy and self-efficacy,91 while enhanced autonomy positively impacts
both law student happiness and learning itself.92
GAP
(1992),
available
at
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2013_leg
al_education_and_professional_development_maccrate_report).authcheckdam.pdf.
89
It even introduces the kinds of transactional planning work that some critics suggest
is often underemphasized current legal education. For a summary of commentary on the need
for more teaching of transactional skills in law schools, see Carol Goforth, Transactional
Skills Training Across the Curriculum, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 904 (2017).
90
Allison D. Martin & Kevin L. Rand, The Future’s So Bright I Gotta Wear Shades:
Law School through the Lens of Hope, 48 DUQ. L. REV. 203, 214-217 (2010); Carol L.
Wallinger, Autonomy Support 101: How Using Proven Autonomy Support Techniques Can
Increase Law Student Autonomy, Engender Hope, and Improve Outcomes, 48 DUQ. L. REV.
385, 396-98 (2010)
91
See Larry Krieger & Kennon Sheldon, Does Legal Education Have Undermining
Effects on Law Students? Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being, 22
BEHAV. SCH. LAW 261, 262-67 (2004); see also Corie Rosen, Creating the Optimistic
Classroom: What Law Schools Can Learn from Attribution Style Effects, 42 MCGEORGE L.
REV. 319, 324 (2011) (locating destabilizing effects of legal education across types of
courses and law schools).
92
See Louis N. Schultz & A. Adam Ding, Alternative Justifications for Academic
Support III: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Academic Support and Humanizing Law
School, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 999, 1002-11 (2012) (reviewing literature supporting the
THE
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Impressively, our student-lawyers easily blend their doctrinal questions
with their intrapersonal ones: they know both that they must learn more about
the areas of law they plan to research and that having that information will
not alone be sufficient to resolve the client’s current insistence on entirely
separating her wealth from her betrothed’s. These students’ contextual legal
work not only helps erase the doctrine/skills divide,93 it may also enhance the
transfer of learning from one setting to another.
Educational theorists use the term “transfer” to describe learning that
takes place in one context being used in another.94 Anyone who has ever
taught, well… anything, probably recognizes the exceeding difficulty of
helping learners transfer prior knowledge95 to new settings, and of getting
them to deploy it effectively. It could be argued that learning which is not
transferred is not actually learned at all—otherwise, it would have been
available for use in new circumstances. Researchers who study learning have
found that a good way to increase transfer is to provide multiple opportunities
for learners to practice applying what they are learning, 96 ideally in
circumstances that will help them see the underlying functions of the matter
(its “deep structure”97) rather than becoming fixated on surface-level
commonalities or distinctions.98 Immersion work automatically and of
positive impact of greater student autonomy in law schools); Paula J. Manning,
Understanding the Impact of Inadequate Feedback: A Means to Reduce Law Student
Psychological Distress, Increase Motivation, and Improve Learning Outcomes, 43 CUMB. L.
REV. 225, 229-33 (2013) (summarizing proven effects of self-determination and autonomy
support on achievement).
93
As Kristen Holmquist observes: “the result of drawing artificial boundaries between
the cognitive and the practical is to limit what it means to think like a lawyer…” Challenging
Carnegie, 61 J. LEGAL EDUC. 353, 365 (2012).
94
HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, EXPERIENCE, AND SCHOOL, 51 (John D.
Bransford, Ann L. Brown, and Rodney R. Cocking, eds. 2000).
95
The term “prior knowledge” has a specific and important meaning in educational
theory. Students connect what they learn to things they already know, and research suggests
that can often be a helpful scaffold to learning, but also sometimes a hindrance if the activated
prior knowledge is insufficient or inappropriate. For a useful overview of research on prior
knowledge in learning theory see SUSAN A. AMBROSE et al., HOW LEARNING WORKS: 7
RESEARCH-BASED PRINCIPLES FOR SMART TEACHING, 10-39 (2010).
96
ROBERT E. HASKELL, TRANSFER OF LEARNING: COGNITION, INSTRUCTION AND
REASONING 45-47 (2001).
97
DANIEL T. WILLINGHAM, WHY DON’T STUDENTS LIKE SCHOOL?: A COGNITIVE
SCIENTIST ANSWERS QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE MIND WORKS AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR
THE CLASSROOM, 133-37 (2009) (observing that experts are able to transfer knowledge and
think more abstractly than novices because they organize well-understood material much
more conceptually).
98
See generally, Mary Nicol Bowman & Lisa Brodoff, Cracking Student Silos: Linking
Legal Writing and Clinical Learning Through Transference, 25 CLINICAL L. REV. 269, 28081 (2019) (considering ways to facilitate transfer of skills between first-year legal writing
classes and upper-level clinical courses).
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necessity requires that kind of practice. It also pushes students toward higherorder thinking about the law at issue,99 which likely generates the sort of
deeper comprehension that is indispensable for transfer.
Meanwhile, in addition to considering the “facts” of what we want
students to learn in law school, legal educators must also be cognizant of our
own factual contexts. If many disparate scholars have suggested reforming
legal education, and a wide variety of thinkers are already invested in
integrative learning in law schools, what realities on the ground are
preventing it from becoming more pervasive?
One certainly is the always-present limitation of time. No one ever has
enough of it, and law professors are hardly immune from time constraints.
There are few readily-available products that can immersively structure an
entire semester-long or year-long inquiry into a subject in the way that more
traditional casebooks do. So creating an immersion course currently requires
a sizeable investment of time that creating a casebook-driven course may
not.100 Furthermore, the differential time investment may not end after a onetime investment in course design. Instead, immersive classes require ongoing
supervision of student work, including review of students’ planning, research,
performance with clients and supervisors, and of course comments on their
writing.
But there are ways to control at least some of the faculty workload in
these courses. Having students work in teams, for example, fractionalizes the
number of individual papers to be reviewed. Assigning students to reflect on
some of their work processes, performances, and products—in addition to
being a key practice for self-regulated learning—has the benefit of giving the
faculty member a concrete summary and a sense of the students’ own
understanding of their work to concentrate their responses upon. Guidelines
or rubrics can also be introduced to help faculty members streamline their
feedback and maximize the information conveyed while reducing the time
invested.101 Moreover, as more and more law schools are encouraging or even
requiring formative assessments that add to faculty workloads,102 the
That is to say, toward the highest levels in Bloom’s Taxonomy of Evaluating, or even
Creating. This compares favorably to casebook learning of legal doctrine, which aims
primarily at achieving the intermediate levels of Applying legal rules and Analyzing them in
factual context, and despite the best intentions of its users may at times only accomplish the
introductory cognition levels of Remembering or Understanding the rules introduced.
BENJAMIN BLOOM, et al., TAXONOMY OF EDUCATIONAL OBJECTIVES: HANDBOOK 1, THE
COGNITIVE DOMAIN (1956).
100
Perhaps over time the legal academy or some external commercial enterprise may
address that imbalance?
101
See, e.g., Sophie Sparrow, Describing the Ball: Improve Teaching by Using Rubrics
– Explicit Grading Criteria, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1.
102
Olympia Duhart, The ‘F’ Word: the Top Five Complaints (and Solutions) About
99
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distinction between the time commitments involved in immersive teaching
and more traditional casebook teaching may be growing less distinct. Despite
all of the many strategies that can make this kind of teaching manageable,
though, there is no denying that it can be a lot of work. And there remains the
unequivocal factual reality that for sheer logistical reasons, immersive class
size must usually be smaller than it is in casebook lecture courses.103 This is
hopefully offset by the educational value for students and the unalloyed
enjoyment it can offer faculty.
Another concern for many law faculty members is expertise. Or more
accurately, a comfort with their own expertise (or their ability to develop it)
with respect to the material of a subject they might teach, but discomfort with
the limitless array of mastery that immersion learning entails. It’s reasonable
to recognize that few of us feel equally capable of teaching legal doctrine,
reviewing legal writing, supervising students’ interactions with clients and
experts, commenting on their research strategies, and so on. And probably for
good reason. There are decades of accreted wisdom to assimilate in every one
of these fields. Yet law professors routinely take on the teaching of new
subjects despite our not-yet-fully-developed proficiency in teaching them.
We hope and expect that we will do reasonably well to begin with, and will
get better over time. Too, are not most law professors already specialists in
legal research, legal analysis and legal writing? Many have also practiced law
in the areas in which they teach, but for those who have not there is perhaps
the option of co-teaching an immersive course with another law professor or
an adjunct faculty practitioner who possesses the requisite experience.
We expect law students and beginning lawyers to develop a divergent
collection of professional competencies.104 We tell students no one expects
them to be perfect in all arenas at once, and that the vulnerability they feel in
learning to do something they have not done before is not a weakness—it is
a vital precursor to growth. Can we really expect any less of ourselves?
III. INTERPRETING RULES
Student C: I think it’s great that Frankie and Saanvi
Formative Assessment, 67 J. LEGAL EDUC. 531, 536-38 (2018).
103
For example my Family Law in Practice course currently caps at twenty-eight
registrants. That’s considerably fewer than a more traditional family law survey course may
enroll, but it is still a reasonably economical way to deliver a high-quality educational
experience to plenty of law students.
104
For one example of the myriad skills needed for law practice, see the twenty-six
Shultz-Zedeck Lawyering Effectiveness Factors identified in the research undertaken on
behalf of the Law School Admissions Council. Quoted in Marjorie M. Schultz & Sheldon
Zedeck, Predicting Lawyer Effectiveness: Broadening the Basis for Law school Admissions
Decisions, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 620 (2011).
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want to have kids. It seems like they’ll be excellent parents.
Student B: I agree, but I feel thrown by the whole donor
idea.
Student A: In what way?
Student B: Well, maybe I’m being too rigid here, but the
idea of a kid having up to four parents is kind of freaking
me out. Two moms and two dads? And don’t get me started
on how this could work legally. It could be a total mess!
Student A: I don’t really feel that way, to be honest. But
on the other hand, I also don’t know how we could set up
legally-binding agreements among all four of them. We
know Frankie and Saanvi’s situation, but what do we really
know about Victor and Anthony? Can they both be legal
parents of this still-hypothetical child? Are they even
legally married, and would that matter with respect to
parentage? Can there possibly be any precedent for this
anywhere?
Student B: Exactly!
Student A: And what if Frankie and Saanvi decide this
is all too complicated for them. Could it be possible for
Anthony or Victor to be a known donor yet not be a legal
father?
Student C: But don’t forget they’ve said they weren’t
necessarily set on the “they are all parents” arrangement.
It’s just one possibility.
Student B: In terms of legal parenting protection, this is
whole thing is scaring me. I can’t imagine we can tell them
anything with any kind of certainty, no matter how we feel
about it personally.
Student C: Look, somebody always had to take a risk on
the outcome for every big change that has ever happened in
the law. Isn’t it actually our client’s job to decide how much
risk she can accept?
Student A: Ok, but do Frankie and Saanvi even know
what the risks are? Do we?
Student C: Folks, we’re getting way ahead of ourselves
by worrying primarily about the most unusual scenario.
The women don’t even know for certain that that’s what
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they want. Our main concern here is with Frankie and
Saanvi and their legal relationship with this child. If they
have a child with a donor, is it legally equally both of
theirs? Do we have to do some work to make even that
happen, no matter whether there are dads we need to worry
about or not?
Student B: That’s helpful. I guess we’d better start
looking at the legal ramifications of one, two, three, or four
parents, since we’re going to have to talk Frankie through
all of them. So where do we start?
A. Students/Lawyers: Understanding Boundaries and Possibilities in
the Interpretation of Legal Rules
This vignette puts our student-lawyers in the position of having to clarify
the current legal rules pertaining to the parentage of a child born in a samesex marriage, in which it is not biologically possible for one child to be the
genetic offspring of both spouses. Since most traditional parentage law arose
in the context of opposite-sex spouses conceiving children or adopting them
together, this will require some interpretive extrapolation of that body of law
to extend to the client’s potential circumstances. Reams of meditative
commentary have been written about the kinds of reasoning that legal
interpretation consists of105 and it is not the project of this Article to review
all of them or to add substantially to that body of thought. Instead it may be
valuable to look more narrowly at what our particular student-lawyers will
have to do with rules of law for the work they now find themselves engaged
in.
Of course the process of “interpreting rules” usually originates first in
fully comprehending the present legal regime through the process of
finding/knowing, stating accurately, and meticulously applying the laws that
currently exist to determine whether they irrefutably cover the facts at hand.
If they do, the lawyers can probably proceed straightforwardly with their
work by using those resolutions.106 The interpretive work (and for lawyers,
105

For one brief summary in a clinical context, see Robert D. Dinerstein & Elliot S.
Milstein, The Indeterminacy of Law in CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note___; see also Anya
Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM & MARY L. REV., 435 (2018) (arguing that
judges must embrace their opportunities and obligations to interpret through discretionary
sources).
106
Although if that outcome turns out to disadvantage their clients the next step may be
to see if they can find a way to interpret the law differently. If so, then this becomes the place
for capable advocacy. If not, then it is what it is. As the Lawyering Method observes, in
finding and interpreting rules “there is an obligation both to be responsibly truthful and the
serve clients faithfully… [which] requires negotiating tensions between the quest for a proper
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the fun?) comes in when there are no clear answer to the client’s problem in
the existing body of legal rules because the law is in flux, the facts are novel,
or as we possibly have here, both.
To answer their client’s immediate questions about parental rights if she
and Saanvi were to add children to their family, our student-lawyers might
therefore begin by thinking through the legal situation for similarly situated
different-sex couples. They could then generate some sort of recent timeline
understanding of how those rules of law have and sometimes have not been
applied to same-sex couples. That is because family law has for generations
been finding ways to protect the parenting rights of married opposite-sex
couples using assisted reproductive technologies.107 Either due to courts’ pure
lack of imagination about the possible multiplicity of family forms,108
differences in legalization of the marital status of the adults,109 or outright
bias,110 families with parents of the same gender have not always
automatically been afforded the same recognition of their status.
or just result and the quest to prevail.” Experiential Learning Lab supra note ___.
107
See, e.g., In re Adoption of Anonymous, 345 N.Y.S.2d 430 (Sur. Ct. 1973)
(recognizing the husband of a woman artificially inseminated with a donor’s sperm as the
lawful father of the child). Also see both the original and currently-revised versions of the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) and the Uniform Status of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA) proffered by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws,
which include stratagems to ensure that both members of an infertile heterosexual couple
will be seen as co-equal parents of a child they conceive through assisted reproduction.
108
Particularly the until-recently-ubiquitous presumption that a child could have at most
one parent of each gender at the same time. See, e.g., N.A.H. and A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354,
357 (Sup. Ct. Colo. 2000) (“[b]ecause a can have only one legal father…”). Cf. Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990)
(early advocacy for legal recognition of more than one parent of the same gender).
109
Prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, or to individual state determinations to solemnize
same-sex marriage or provide comity to same-sex marriages from other jurisdictions. Same
sex marriages still have an extraordinarily short history in the U.S., beginning slowly after
first being recognized in Massachusetts in 2004. Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 789
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2004).
110
There were, of course, longstanding presumptions that gay men and lesbian were
perforce unfit parents. For but one example see the saga of Sharon Bottoms, whose own
mother successfully sued to remove her child from her care after Bottoms began a
relationship with a women. Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102 (Va. 1995). It is occasionally
hard to read some court decisions about legal parentage as grounded in anything but
prejudice. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (denying
legal parenthood to a now-divorced transgender husband of an inseminated wife, despite the
state having listed him as the father on the child’s birth certificate, despite uncontested
statutory authority conferring parenthood on the male spouse of a woman using donor
insemination to conceive, and despite a “savings clause” in the state parentage act intended
to provide for legal fatherhood even in the event the marriage conferring that status was
subsequently deemed invalid, as this one had been.)
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Once they begin their research our student-lawyers will find they have to
sort through some earlier cases in their states recognizing (or not) de facto
parents,111 cases granting (or not) “second parent” adoptions112 to previouslynonlegal same-sex parents, and will have to discover whether postObergefell, their state now permits married partners of the same gender to be
listed together parents on a child’s birth certificate from the time of
delivery113 without the requirement of an adoption or any further judicial
action. That is a dizzying set of evolutions in the law to get to the present
rules, and understanding the history of these changes may be crucial for
anyone who seeks to give advice about how the law would treat parentage for
a family like Frankie’s and Saanvi’s.
All this just to understand the law governing the most straightforward
possibility the vignette suggests Frankie and Saanvi might consider: having
a child who is the biological progeny of one of the women in the partnership,
gestated by her with the intention of producing issue of the marriage, with no
plan for legal involvement by the sperm donor.
Then the student-lawyers will have to consider ramifications of
associated alternatives their client might select, including: What if the couple
decides to expand their family by adoption rather than pregnancy? What if
doctors implant the fertilized egg of one woman into the womb of another?
What if the couple decides to use a known sperm donor rather than an
anonymous one? What if he is the biological relative of the non-inseminated
partner and therefore the non-inseminating mother has some genetic link to
the child? What if the couple wants the donor to have an ongoing relationship
with the child; does he then have to be a recognized parent? What if they
would like him to be a legal father? And finally, what if, as seems to be
making Student B so very apprehensive, they really do plan to have two legal
fathers and two legal mothers for their not-yet-conceived child?
Many of these questions have pretty definitive answers, though ones that

111

The American Law Institute recognizes parentage by estoppel or in effect ALI
PRINCIPLES § 203(1)(c); see more generally, Lea Moalemi, Blood Will Not Justify My
Relation: Same-Sex Couples and their Battle for Standing as De Facto Parents, 56 FAM. CT.
REV. 490 (2018); Susan E. Oram, De Facto Parental Rights: A View from the Trenches, 23
ME. B.J. 150 (2008).
112
See, e.g., Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993); see generally, Jane S.
Schacter, Constructing Families in a Democracy: Courts, Legislatures and Second-Parent
Adoption, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 933 (2000).
113
A minority but growing number of states now routinely list married same-sex partners
as parents on the birth certificate of a child born to the marriage, thus obviating the need for
a second-parent adoption (although even in those states non-biological parents are sometimes
advised to nonetheless complete an adoption as additional protection against any dispute).
Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1185,
1240-49 (2016).
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may vary significantly from state to state.114 Our student-lawyers must
research to find out what those answers are. In doing so they will teach
themselves quite a significant body of family law. And since there might
always be the possibility the family could relocate, they should have at least
a rough notion of how those responses might be different in other states. In
other words, they have to fully learn the existing legal rules.
With respect to the final question, though, which our vignette indicates is
not just a moot hypothetical but instead a real possibility their client is raising,
the students-lawyers are probably going to find that the question is a new one
and the law at present provides no conclusive precedent.115 The best they can
hope to do is to interpret—to imaginatively yet critically extend—the existing
rules of law in an effort to try to predict how it might be applied to the alluded
four-parent scenario.
Interpretative work in law often starts from analogical thinking.116 If two
circumstances are similar, then the same rule of law ought to govern both.117
This, though, begs the question what makes different situations sufficiently
“similar.”
Our student-lawyers might start by asking whether there are any cases
already recognizing more than two legal parents. If they tried that avenue they
would probably soon discover that advocacy on behalf of stepparents has
resulted in a number of cases of their being granted status in loco parentis118
even without termination of the parenting rights and obligations of one of the
original legally-sanctioned parents.119 These cases somewhat acknowledge
the possibility of a family having three adults functioning as parents due to
the exigencies of remarriage. Student-lawyers might also encounter opinions
permitting a reduction from two-parent families to one where warranted by
the facts, despite statutes designed to perpetuate continuation of at least two

114

See id. at 1140-65.
At the time of this writing they are going to find just a very few cases, none of which
establish unequivocal precedent. Probably the most closely-related circumstances arise in a
New York case determining that a third parent had standing to seek custody and visitation of
the child he had been raising with his husband (the child’s biological and legal father) and
their friend 9the child’s biological and legal mother). Raymond T. v. Samantha G., 74
N.Y.S.3d 730 (Fam. Ct. 2018). But their research should also show that so far that case
remains an outlier, and has not persuaded other jurisdictions.
116
Schott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational
Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923 (1996).
117
Id. at 931-34.
118
Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents as Third Parties in Relation to their Stepchildren,
40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 100-102 (2006).
119
A termination of the parenting rights of an original parent is ordinarily required for a
stepparent adoption, usually upon consent of the terminating parent, but occasionally over
his or her objection (e.g., In the matter of J.J.J., 718 P.2d 948 (Alaska 1986)).
115
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legal parents.120 Or they’ll locate other decisions restricting the expansion of
parenting rights in new family formations to ones that can be seen as “the
functional equivalent of the traditional husband-wife relationship.”121 Are
these circumstances “similar” to Frankie’s and Saanvi’s potential four-parent
family? Unclear, but it does highlight why in the vignette our student-lawyers
are rightly interested in finding out whether the proposed dads are married.
The stepparent rules may end up being analogized in some argument favoring
legal status for all four parents.
Using what they learn about the history of recognizing parentage in
assisted reproductive technology cases, or for stepparents, the team of
student-lawyers might try to interpret those rules by reasoning deductively122
(working from the general to the particular) or inductively123 (working from
the particular to the general). In addition, Frankie’s attorneys might also want
to consider the policy basis for the rules in interpreting whether existing law
might somehow reach to cover a family with two mothers and two fathers.124
An understanding of the reasons for what the law currently is helps predict
what it might become under the new circumstances.
Our student-lawyers absolutely must engage in this interpretation of legal
rules in order to answer their client’s question. Yet even they already
understand that in such novel circumstances it is extraordinarily unlikely they
will ever produce an unambiguous answer. It is almost undoubtedly true that
no amount of reading, research or thoughtful interpretation of the law will
120
See, e.g., In re: Z.E., 21019 WL 3779711 (Pa. Super Ct. 2019) (not reported) (against
strict interpretation of adoption statute, the court permitted termination of a biological
father’s paternity absent the usually-required averment of intended adoption by new father,
due to the horrific circumstances of the children having been conceived as the product of
decades-long rape of the mother and a possible ongoing threat of abuse to the children even
with the incarceration of the biological father).
121
Adoption of Garrett, 841 N.Y.S.2d 731, 732 (Sur. Ct. 2007) (denying paternal
adoption of a child by the brother of the biological/legal mother).
122
The beginning point in articulating the process of deduction is often attributed to
Aristotle (with perhaps an updated nod to Sherlock Holmes), and is taught in nearly all
philosophy courses specializing in logic. See also JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK, 79-90
(1991). Introductory legal writing/legal analysis textbooks commonly explain processes of
deductive reasoning in some detail in order to show beginning law students how they will be
expected to reason. For just one such sample, see BRETT A. BROSSEIT, ELIZABETH M.
MORTENSON & SARAH D. MURPHY, APPLIED CRITICAL THINKING & LEGAL ANALYSIS:
PERFORMANCE OPTIMIZATION FOR LAW STUDENTS AND PROFESSIONALS, 139-41 (2017).
123
Again, frequently attributed to Aristotle. For an in-depth examination of basic
principles of induction see IRVING M. COPI, CARL COHEN & VICTOR RODYCH,
INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC, 495-599 (15th ed., 2019); see also APPLIED CRITICAL THINKING,
id. at 133-35 (summarizing induction for a law student audience).
124
Policy arguments are grounded in normative claims about what is a public good. See
MICHAEL EVAN GOLD, A PRIMER ON LEGAL REASONING, 122-37 (2018); WILSON HUHN,
THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT, 51-53 (2002).
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fully conclude the investigation. In the absence of square precedent from
within their exact jurisdiction which specifically recognizes a four-parent
family comprised of two same-sex couples with two members who are the
biological progenitors of the child, our student-lawyers will probably not be
able to provide a conclusive answer to their client about the legal status of
such a family. That precedent certainly does not exist at the moment.
Even suppose it did. Depending on the client’s determination and the
advocate’s creativity, it is still precisely in the nature of lawyers to look for
ways to compare or distinguish such precedent to argue that it should or
should not determine Frankie and Saanvi’s case. The only thing that could
unquestionably settle the law for Frankie and Saanvi would be a final
statement of the law in their specific case by a judge deciding it. That in turn
would prompt subsequent refinement of the rules when some relatedly- but
differently- constituted families argue that the (hypothetical future)
Frankie/Saanvi case did or did not apply to them. Thus illustrating the almostendless cycle of interpreting rules of law. Also exemplifying why the
processes of interpreting law and fact are inextricably interwoven.
But our student-lawyers must assist their client now. They have to help
decide in the absence of well-settled precedent whether they want to take the
legal risks associated with building a four-parent family. Facts and rules may
be ever-entangled in law, but as is so commonly true, here the rules will affect
the facts we have to work with because they may end up determining how
our client sets about trying to bring a child into her family in the first place.
The lawyers’ interpretation of the rules will influence Frankie’s
understanding of how much legal risk would be involved in a currentlyuntested family formation, which in turn could have a direct consequences
on how Frankie ultimately constructs her family.
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Using Well-Chosen Factual Settings to
Stimulate Interpretation of Legal Rules
Given the enterprise of this Article, this section could proceed in several
directions. We might ask: how do we navigate and interpret the rules of legal
education? Or alternatively: what is the role of interpreting rules in legal
education?
The enquiries do not truly diverge, however. It could be fairly said that
virtually all aims of legal education and its pedagogy are concerned with
imparting both the substance of a common body of legal rules and the ability
to use them professionally. Most of the unresolved disputes in law teaching
stem from differing emphases on those proficiencies or on differing ideas
about how to impart them, not from disagreement that both matter. So this
project takes as given that institutions of legal education care about students
learning bodies of substantive law and skills in interpreting and using it.
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Assuming that’s true, the “rules”125 structuring law school courses tend
to require classes to straddle some middle ground between introducing the
specific common law principles and statutes that govern the topic we teach,
and probing more deeply into the meaning of the discipline or of the workings
of law itself. No one law school course can ever teach all of the rules of law
there are to know on a particular legal topic. Even if it could the law would
keep changing and evolving; its practitioners must be adept at interpreting
the extant rules and applying them to new situations. Thus the common law
professors’ debate about topical “coverage” in their courses126 misses the
point. A pretty indisputable rule about law classes, then, is that we cannot
ever possibly cover everything.127
One thing every course can reasonably aim to do, though, is to ensure
students are given the opportunity to deeply encounter the core concepts of
its subject. Educational theorists Aaron Pallas and Anna Neumann define
core concepts as those “basic building blocks” that depict “a field’s unique
substantive concerns and distinctive knowledge structures and dynamics.”128
In other words, they form a base from which further meaningful inquiry into
the subject could, and would have to, spring. Think “supply and demand” in
economics, for example.129 Understanding that notion—really understanding
it—is foundational to learning pretty much anything else in the field.
It is important to distinguish “core concepts” from the “topics” typically
covered in a particular subject. First of all, there are probably fewer of them.
Maybe at most three or four. Maybe only one. The core concepts will be those
ideas or processes which by their very nature provide a gateway to learning
all of the topics that the subject matter can muster. For lawyers, the core
Here, “norms” might be a more accurate descriptor, if we see that designation as
encompassing both behaviors that are required and those that are only customary and
expected. Both norms and rules can function similarly to control conduct, though of course
the consequences for violating them might be very different. Indeed, some earlier versions
of the Lawyer Method Elements did reference “norms” as a category and include legal rules
as a subset within that umbrella. (Unpublished manuscripts on file with the author). But the
familiarity and clarity of referencing “rules” has its appeal as well—even if at times those
“rules” are more metaphorical than mandatory.
126
For a few examples of legal educators’ skepticism regarding concerns about coverage
justifying resistance to new teaching methodologies, see Steven I. Friedland, Trumpeting
Change: Replacing Tradition with Engaged Legal Education, 3 Elon L. REV. 93, 125-26
(2011); Robert F. Blomquist, Some Thoughts on Law School Curriculum Reform: Scaling
the Mountainside, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 641, 656-57 (1995).
127
Another corresponding rule is that we are probably never really finished teaching
anything. It is unrealistic to assume that one class or one year is enough time to fully master
the intricate nuances of lawyers’ thinking, for example, so teachers of upper-level law classes
are probably remiss if they do not include teaching legal analysis as one objective of their
course.
128
CONVERGENT TEACHING, supra note ___ at 67.
129
Id. at 68.
125
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concepts of our subject matter almost always boil down to the law’s ways of
addressing weighty social matters like “punishment” in criminal law, or
perhaps “responsibility” in torts. If our students struggle to understand that
this is what the body of law they are learning is about, they may study an
array of legal rules but will be ill-equipped to truly and deeply know those
rules, or to actually use them. Law teachers would be well advised to think
clearly about what core concepts they want to get across in their subjects, and
to concentrate on and return to those core concepts until their students move
toward mastery. Then we must enable students to bring those concepts to the
many topics the subjects typically include.
So what are the core concepts in family law?
Like almost anything in law, that could probably be debated endlessly.
But I believe it would not be too controversial to suggest that one core
concept is what makes someone the parent of a child with all of the ensuing
legal privileges and responsibilities that status grants. Many potentiallyconflicting factors might dispose of that question: genetics,130 intention,131 or
perhaps habit, or function.132 These factors may historically have been hard
to disaggregate, because they usually converge when a fertile heterosexual
couple conceives by ordinary means. But parentage gets more complicated
and more interesting, when those factors are not in exact alignment. Thus the
bulk of parentage law in most family law courses arises in contexts where the
factors conflict, forcing courts or legislators to establish hierarchies among
the considerations. Decisions about which factors matter most may change

130

It is sometimes important legally to distinguish genetics from biology, because they
may not always correspond. In cases of gestational surrogacy the woman who biologically
gives birth to a child may not have any genetic connection to the infant, and may not be the
child’s legal parent. See Mark Strasser, The Updating of Baby M: A Confused Jurisprudence
Becomes More Confusing, 78 U. PITT. L. REV. 181,183, 194-201 (2016). Conversely, in
donor egg insemination, a woman who gives birth to a child may have no genetic relationship
yet be both the intended and legal parent of a child she gave birth to. See NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§
802-804, 809, 815 (2017) [hereinafter UPA].
131
UPA, id. §703 (relying on “intent to be a parent” for legal parentage in assisted
reproduction cases). The state of California even provides statutory forms giving lawful
effect to stated intentions of parenting in assisted reproduction cases. CAL. FAM. CODE §
7613.5. The student-lawyers should also note, though, that the UPA remains model
legislation that has not been widely adopted, and that California law is considered to be a
leader in the area of intentional parenting, and even that state does not permit intention to
supersede genetics in all instances. See Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. Rptr. 3d 789 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2014) (holding that a sperm donor was not precluded from asserting presumed
biological parentage).
132
That is, by acting as a de facto parent. See UPA § 609, id. For a mapping of de facto
parentage
laws
in
different
U.S.
jurisdictions
see
https://www.lgbtmap.org/img/maps/citations-parents-de-facto.pdf.
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over time, and they can be diametrically opposite in different jurisdictions.133
Learning this teaches burgeoning family lawyers that all of the considerations
matter to some extent, and there is no easy consensus about how to resolve
difficult questions about such a profoundly important question as “Who is a
parent?”
Does it go without saying that our vignette shows the student-lawyers
preparing to grapple with precisely that question? And that they seem already
to have a sense of the immense importance of the answer for their client and
her potential future child?
In a similar vein, the earlier vignette in Part I included student-lawyers
contending with what most family law scholars would identify as another
core concept in the subject matter: what is the legal, cultural and personal
significance of marriage? Here is where the framing of the facts and
characters as written by Davis and Davenport shows a particular genius. By
presenting student-lawyers with a client who is trying to decide whether to
get married at all, the students have to consider carefully the distinction
between personal relationship decisions and the benefits and obligations
conferred by the state within the legal institution of marriage. They have to
ask themselves why marriage is a function of government at all, rather than
purely a private commitment. Perhaps they will begin to interrogate the line
demarking personal autonomous choice in family formation and what is, or
should be, part of the public purview.134
This is a significant departure from the approach Susan Apel took in her
visionary family law simulation course. There, an already-married client’s
presenting issue was a divorce.135 By tracing the typical stages of the divorce,
Apel’s students move through the topics commonly taught in family law
casebook classes: rules governing child support, division of marital property,
spousal support obligations, and so forth.136 Apel beautifully demonstrates
that with thoughtful manipulation of character and fact, doctrinal “coverage”
is just as easy (or difficult) to achieve in an immersion course as it is in a
more traditional one.137 In fact, I did just that for my own immersion course.
133

E.g., with respect to functional parenting laws, compare Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.
3d 283 (N.M. 2012) with McGuffin v. Overton, 542 N.W.2d 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), app.
den., 546 N.W.2d 256 (Mich. 1996).
134
Which might further spur the more philosophically-minded among them to wonder
whether that question more fundamentally lies under virtually all of the great unresolvable
questions in law.
135
No More Casebooks, supra note ___ at 701.
136
Id. at 703.
137
Though not without allowing for some convenient artificialities. For example in my
Family Law and Practice class students draft a prenuptial contract which sadly never gets
signed, so that when Frankie and Saanvi later get divorced my students will have to employ
state regulations to resolve how their property will be divided.
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As I was creating my version I scanned the contents of just about all of the
family law casebooks on the market, selected the topics that seemed common
among them and also struck me as particularly important, and then modified
Davis and Davenport’s narratives so the progress of the clients’ cases would
naturally raise each one. It wasn’t especially hard to do.
But the innovation that Davis and Davenport’s scenario brings is a more
critical and fundamental investigation into the legal institution of marriage.
To answer some of Frankie’s questions in the first vignette, the studentlawyers had to think deeply about the very meaning of marriage in law and
society. This consequently allows the class to bring in some of the larger
constitutional questions about family autonomy and the role of the state. 138
Addressing these core questions experientially, with the explicit goal of
helping their own client think them through, enriches the students’
understanding of marriage itself. That should in turn strengthen their mastery
and retention of the many legal rules pertaining to marriage law that they will
learn along the way.
Likewise, by asking themselves whether existing parenting laws can be
interpreted to permit a two-mother-two-father family, our student lawyers
will simultaneously develop a deeper understanding of what the law does
currently establish.139
I would posit that the Davis/Davenport scenario is simply one excellent
example of the kind of fictional universe that by its very design requires deep
engagement with core concepts in its subject matter. Further, that scenarios
engaging identified core concepts could be created for virtually any subject
in law. And finally, that having that engagement be an essential outgrowth of
their client work enables students to survey the legal rules of the subject while
at the same time reinforcing their learning about lawyers’ interpretive
processes, which can always be further developed.
IV. MANAGING INTERACTIONS
Student A: Gosh, it’s so sad to work on a divorce. I
suppose I am not the only one relieved when it seems, like
it does for Saanvi,140 the couple hopes to treat each other
138

For example in addition to the obviously directly-relevant Obergefell decision,
students read and consider Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
139
With a concomitant investigation of the big-picture constitutional background in
cases like Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Michael H. v. Gerald D. 504 U.S.
905 (1988).
140
In defiance of professional responsibility rules (and basic ethics) students who have
thus far represented Frankie now switch to working with Saanvi in the marital dissolution
section of the course. This serves the purpose of introducing a different client’s perspective
without having to take time for the class to learn a new family’s facts. Though we generally
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respectfully. Those angry scorched-earth breakups are
terrible for the couple and I imagine they take a lot out of
the attorneys, too.
Student B: I guess so. But my impression is some
lawyers like that. Maybe even encourage it.
Student C: Well we’re certainly not going to do that. Yet
I don’t think that’s a guarantee that everything this divorce
is, and will, remain amicable. I mean…
Student B: [interrupting]… That’s right. No matter how
pragmatically people want to approach it, breakups involve
hurt feelings and can turn messier than anyone ever
expected.
Student A: Plus when there are kids involved, like
Saanvi’s daughter here, the two can have a lot more conflict
than they would if they were just dividing up property.
Student C: Yeah, and the stakes for trying to behave
cooperatively are even higher. Zelda is still a toddler,
which means Saanvi will be actively co-parenting with her
ex for at least another decade and a half. Probably more.
Student A: So do you think Saanvi’s hope for primary
custody is realistic? It seems like Frankie has actually spent
more time with Zelda so far, and I’m guessing Frankie’s
lawyers will fight that. I’m worried, too, that us pushing for
that will make it harder to get a favorable economic
settlement for our client. There are only so many things at
issue to negotiate.
Student B: Hold on a minute! I know you probably
didn’t mean to suggest it, but to me there’s something
super-uncomfortable about the idea that we might trade
time with the kid for money in a divorce.
Student A: Of course that’s not what I meant!
Although… [spoken more tentatively] um, isn’t that sort of
what sometimes happens in a divorce settlement? We have
to do a good job representing Saanvi’s interests in every
area we negotiate. And sometimes matters in a negotiation
end up connected.
strive where possible for verisimilitude, there are certainly times when we use the advantages
of artificiality to facilitate immersion learning.
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Student C: Ok. We have got our work cut out for us
prepping for our settlement conference with Frankie’s
lawyers.
A. Students/Lawyers: Treating Interactive Work as a Challenging and
Vital Part of their Profession
This vignette leaps ahead in time. Frankie and Saanvi have legally wed
(alas without ever having signed a prenuptial agreement even though my
students drafted one!) and have been raising their141 child together. Our
student-lawyers now represent Saanvi, and the couple is currently
contemplating divorce. Our student-lawyers are doing well to carefully
contrast what their client has thus far presented with what can typically
happen in the difficult circumstances of dissolving a long-term relationship,
especially one where child custody may be contested.
They know what she asked them to do—behave reasonably and fairly
toward Frankie while settling the asset division and seeking exclusive or
primary custody of Zelda—and they suspect she may be unrealistic in failing
to realize those objectives may conflict. The lawyers appear appropriately
concerned, and they are committed to exploring the tensions these interests
may pose.
As her advocates, they probably should be.
Divorce cases are some of the most emotionally-laden and important
settings most family lawyers work in.142 The complexity of the work in my
class is amplified by the fact that the divorce takes place in New York. The
state retains fault-based causes of action in divorce proceedings, and was the
last in the US to freely sanction divorces without allegation of wrongdoing.143
If the divorce were litigated, allegations and proof of fault by one party could
potentially affect not just the grounds for terminating the legal marriage144
141
The child is legally theirs alone. In the facts the student-lawyers are given, one
member of the male couple who considered parenthood with our protagonists did end up
donating sperm, but neither he nor his partner considers himself the child’s father. While the
men spend some time with Zelda, neither has ended up having a genuine parenting role in
her life.
142
Examining the body of family law more generally, but providing a perfect
encapsulation of the stereotyped divorce action, Clare Huntington observes that “in its
dispute-resolution mode, law intervenes in a heavy-handed and adversarial fashion, often
exacerbating family conflicts by pitting one family member against another in a zero-sum,
win-lose battle.” CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW LAW UNDERMINES
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS, at xii (2014).
143
NY Dom. Rel. L. § 170.7, permitting divorce on the grounds that a marriage has
broken down irretrievably for a period of at least six months, was adopted in 2010.
144
In New York these consist of abandonment, cruel and inhuman treatment, extended
imprisonment, adultery, or judgment following a legally ordered or privately agreed-upon
separation. See NY Dom. Rel. L. §§ 170.1-170.6.

27-Feb-20]

Method Lawyering

41

but the terms of post-nuptial economic arrangements.145 Perhaps it could even
impact custody or visitation.146
To be effective advocates for Saanvi our student-lawyers are going to
have to ask some very sensitive questions. They will naturally have to probe
into some personal areas of her relationship that Saanvi may—but far more
likely may not—feel comfortable talking about.147 They may have to help her
sort through which feelings are important but not necessarily legally
significant (“I just can’t believe she said that to me!”) and which might be
material to her case. Meanwhile, anyone facing the prospect of divorce is
likely to be distressed, anxious about the future, and perhaps defensive and
eager to protect the memory of positive parts of the relationship, or
conversely, to reject the possibility of anything positive about the past or the
future.
While preparing for what will ideally be a settlement in their case, the
student-lawyers will constantly have to manage their interpersonal
communications with Saanvi. 148 They will have to establish her overall
objectives, help her sort her priorities, and counsel her to compare those
desires against what would be realistically achievable in litigation. Next they
will have to get ready to advocate for her with opposing counsel, and
eventually in court if the parties are unable agree on a private dissolution. In
other words, every phase of their work will require effective interpersonal
interactions, rather with their client, another advocate, or possibly eventually
a judge hearing the case.
Clinical professors in law have probably always paid attention to the
interpersonal dimensions of lawyering.149 A wider range of legal scholars
began to catch up to the importance of the human aspects of law with the

For one court’s extended and thoughtful examination of ways marital fault may relate
to post-nuptial property allocation and spousal support, see Mani v. Mani, 183 N.J. 70 (2005).
146
Courts do strive to treat interpersonal difficulties between spouses as quite distinct
from the parties’ roles as parents. But it is also easy to see how facts establishing at least
some legal grounds for divorce (for example cruelty or abandonment) could also bleed into
the court’s assessment of a child’s best interests.
147
For example, does anyone feel truly at ease when asking adult in a professional
context for details about her sexual compatibility with her partner? Lawyers can (must?)
learn techniques for asking uncomfortable questions of their clients. But that probably does
not make it easy even for highly-experience practitioners, let alone the budding attorneys
who are actually managing Saanvi’s case.
148
See Mary Pat Treuthart, A Perspective on Teaching and Learning Family Law, 75
UMKC L. REV. 1047, 1048-49 (2007) (describing her own work as a family law practitioner
and observing that “even when the legal aspects were… routine” her interactions with clients
made it invigorating).
149
Brook K. Baker, Learning to Fish, Fishing to Learn: Guided Participation in the
Interpersonal Ecology of Practice, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1999).
145
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emergence in the 1990s of a field explicitly studying law and emotion.150 But
this is not to suggest that managing interpersonal interactions is limited to
handling people’s feelings. Instead it goes to the core of what it means to
represent clients.151 The Lawyering Method explains that as a central
component of their work, attorneys “communicate with clients,
counterparties, witnesses, and various kinds of decisionmakers.”152 This
inevitably requires “managing each interaction strategically to further
institutional or client goals without being wrongfully deceptive or
inappropriately manipulative.”153
Because our student-lawyers will ultimately need to advocate on their
client’s behalf, they know that had better take care to listen to her carefully
now. They stand in between their client and the person who will decide
something incredibly important in her life, so their job is not just to
understand and care about her goal of getting her son home, but to anticipate
how they can put her in the most favorable position with the deciding body.
Thus the attorneys must find ways now to counsel their client (which often
takes the form of questioning their client or even disagreeing with her154) all
while earning and retaining her trust. And they must do so while keeping in
mind what they believe will eventually be the most effective way of
persuasively interacting with agency officials or a judge.
Notice how inextricably the interpersonal is entwined with the facts and
the law.155 The student-lawyers in our vignette understand that what they
150
See THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999). For additional current
resources on law and emotion see Robin West, Law’s Emotions, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT.
339 (2016); Carleton J. Patrick, A New Synthesis for Law and Emotions: Insights from the
Behavioral Sciences, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1239 (2105).
151
Grant H. Morris believes that confronting the emotional issues lawyers deal with in
the practice of law is “an essential part of practical skills and professional identity
development” for law students. Teaching with Emotion: Enriching the Educational
Experience of First-Year Law, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 465474 (2010).
152
Available at https://www.law.nyu.edu/node/29418.
153
Id.
154
“I believe lawyers should give advice, sometimes forcefully…” Abbe Smith, “I Ain’t
Takin’ No Plea”: The Challenges in Counseling Young People Facing Serious Time, 60
RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 16 (2007). Some scholars might find that directedness antithetical to
the “client-centered” lawyering introduced in 1977 by David Binder & Susan Price in their
influential text Legal Interviewing and Counseling: A Client-Centered Approach. But so
long as clients remain the determiners of their own circumstances, at least some
commentators suggest that dialogue between lawyers and clients, even if challenging, is not
inconsistent with client-centeredness or with good lawyering practice. See Robert Dinerstein,
Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 581-93
(1990).
155
Some would argue that the interpersonal is uniquely important in family law. For an
example of the contention that factual and personal context are particularly heavily
implicated in family law, see Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE
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learn about the facts of Saanvi’s case will determine what they can interpret
and argue to be her legal rights. Which will correspondingly affect what they
advise her to agree to and to challenge. Which then establishes how she
authorizes her attorneys to advocate on her behalf. Which sets the parameters
for their arguments and negotiation in her case. And all of this must take into
account the lens through which a judge or other authority may perceive her
case. All of it depends meaningfully on interactive dynamics.
Managing interactions is sophisticated and challenging work. Our law
student-lawyers are only beginning to be introduced to it,156 and they will
probably have to devote many years of their careers to developing real
interactive expertise. But immersion learning immediately and automatically
places these crucial professional skills on the table. It shows beginners who
spend so much of their time in law school absorbing rules and reasoning that
legal doctrine will become only one component of what Eli Wald and Russell
Pearce accurately describe as the immensely relational work of representing
clients.157
B. Professors/Case Supervisors: Managing Faculty Interactions to
Foster Integrated Teaching and Learning
From the professors’ perspective, managing interactions in an immersion
class is one of the true delights of teaching it. It is also one of the most
complex and demanding requirements of this kind of pedagogy.158
Of course, professors interact with students in every class and on every
day. We generally believe it is up to us to guide that discourse successfully
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 28, 316-17 (2018); but see also Kathryn Abrams, Barriers
and Boundaries: Exploring Emotion in the Law of the Family, 16 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & Law
301, 307 (2008) (asserting that at least at the time of writing the law and emotions scholarship
focused on the family was underdeveloped).
156
Though it may well be true that law schools ought to pay far greater attention to
teaching this, and much earlier on. Joshua D. Rosenberg, Teaching Empathy in Law School,
36 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 621, 631 (2002).
157
Eli Wald & Russell G. Pearce, Being Good Lawyers: A Relational Approach to Law
Practice, 29 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 601 (2016). The phrase “relational lawyering” was
perhaps introduced in the early 1990s or before (see Serena Steir, Reframing Legal Skills:
Relational Lawyering, 42 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 303, 303 (1992) (introducing the concept in a
review of two recently-published works on client counseling). It has gained significant
traction and is now in fairly common use. See, e.g., Susan L. Brooks, Mindful Engagement
and Relational Lawyering, 48 SW L. REV. 267 (2019)/
158
Clinical law professors have developed almost a science of supervision to guide their
practices when overseeing student lawyering work. See CLINICAL PEDAGOGY, supra note
___ at 169-252. All law teachers who expect to simulate law practice experiences can learn
a tremendous amount from this scholarship. But because we deal with matters which, in the
end, do not really resolve events in actual peoples’ lives, immersion teachers may also be
able to get away with being slightly less ambitiously deliberate in their supervisory rules.
That may be a fair tradeoff for such a multi-dimensional teaching and learning modality.
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in our own classrooms,159 so we may already treat the “managing” part of the
interaction as a component of our teaching. Yet that work is geometrically
more complicated when students are immersed in real-feeling client
representation.
It may be useful to disaggregate “managing” from “interactions.” First
let’s observe just how many distinct interactions there are. Our vignette
suggests the student-lawyers have already met with their new client, so that’s
one. They will probably end up negotiating with opposing counsel or perhaps
mediating a settlement. That’s at least another, maybe more. They may end
up arguing their client’s case in front of a judge. If so, given the facts as we
know them, we can expect they will need to prepare their client for the
proceeding. Plus the student-lawyers are managing their own collaboration.
In all our vignettes they seem to be doing a pretty good job of advantageously
using their different reactions to the clients, rather than allowing variances to
hamper their teamwork.160 Are we up to five or six interactions just for this
one snippet of one case in the course? There’s plenty to keep adding:
throughout a semester in my Family Law in Practice class students will
interact with a taxation consultant, an expert on child protective proceedings,
multiple supervisors, at least three different clients, a child welfare worker, a
mediator, and one another as opposing counsel.161
In short, the work in the immersion course requires a rather a lot of
interacting. Far more than takes place in a typical casebook-driven course.
This then begs the question: is it the immersion instructor’s job to manage all
of these relations?
Depends on what we mean by “manage.” It is revealing that the MirriamWebster definition for the verb indicates that it can be used either transitively
or intransitively.162 The intransitive version of “to manage” means “to direct
or carry on business.”163 Intransitive verbs do not allow for direct objects, so
159

See generally MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, GERALD F. HESS & SOPHIE M.
SCHWARTZ, WHAT THE BEST LAW TEACHERS DO, 177-85; 241-58 (2013) (detailing the
control yet flexibility with which master law teachers expect to run their classrooms).
160
Let’s be honest about the fact that productive cooperation will probably not always
happen, in which case addressing any tensions within teams is yet another set of interactions
the students, the professor, or both, will have to manage.
161
For my own classes I find it enjoyable to play any of these roles myself, but I usually
don’t have to. Colleagues from both within my institution and outside of it have been eager
to volunteer to come to class and play one of these roles. The variety of differing styles in
interaction is immensely valuable to my students, and having guests play the roles affords
me the opportunity to act as an intermediary, or sort of MC for some of my own classes. [The
very fact that so many busy professionals are keen to play these roles may also say something
about a hunger for new forms of teaching in the legal academy.]
162
MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY (online ed.), available at https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/manage.
163
Id.
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in this meaning of the word the action itself is all. The person managing is
the person doing. But the dictionary lists the transitive form of the verb first:
“to handle or direct with a degree of skills.”164 Thus in this more primary
sense of the term, the person managing is the person facilitating,
coordinating, or maybe overseeing the processes others are involved in. The
definitional distinction here provides a neat metaphor for the kinds of
“managing interactions” that the best immersion teachers probably do. We
create opportunities for student-lawyers to learn in role.
It is precisely that learning in role which so gloriously interleaves
interactive, analytical and problem-solving skills for law students and novice
practitioners. The interpersonal dimension cannot be devalued when it is an
indispensable part of doing the work at hand.165 Substantial research supports
a conclusion that working in role enhances student learning and retention.166
So the very process of managing the myriad interactions our student-lawyers
have to participate in and anticipate can help them master the material they
are learning. At the same time it necessarily improves their experience and
proficiency at interviewing and counseling their client, or persuading
someone on her behalf.
On the faculty side, meanwhile, we probably have a meta- set of
interactions we will need to attend to. How do professors committed to
immersive teaching interact with those in the academy who may not value
it?167 Or with law school administrators who may have concerns about
resource allocation, particularly at the outset in the development phase of a
new model of instruction?
To the first point, it is probably true that very few colleagues will directly
confront an eager immersion instructor to dispute the value of such a course.
164

Id.
Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills,
and the Importance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1225 (2004).
166
See Danial Druckman & Noam Ebner, Onstage or Behind the Scenes? Relative
Learning Benefits of Simulation Role-Play and Design, 39 SIMULATION & GAMING 465
(2008) (summarizing the literature showing benefits of role-based learning); see also Nellie
Munin & Yael Efron, Role-Playing Brings Theory to Life in a Multicultural Learning
Environment, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 309 (2017); Nadja Alexander & Michelle LeBaron, DEATH
OF ROLE-PLAY, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 459 (2010) (which despite its title looks
favorably upon in-role learning). For background thinking about the place of drama and inrole work in learning see AUGUSTO BOAL, GAMES FOR ACTORS AND NON-ACTORS (2d ed.
2002).
167
To the extent that, at least in the 1990s, Leonard D. Pertnoy felt the need to remind
the legal academy that it was actually fine to teach legal skills to law students. Skills is Not
a Dirty Word, 59 MO. L. REV. 169 (1994); cf. Jonathan K. Van Patten, Skills for Law
Students, 61 S.D. L. REV. 165, 195-200 (2016) (concluding that legal education does provide
skills valuable in the practice of law).
165
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Quite the opposite; many law professors purport to favor such a turn toward
more integrated learning in law schools. Yet—we do not ever seem to really
change to get there.168
Managing our professional interactions to generate enthusiasm for
meaningful (but manageable) reform is an important part of moving broadly
toward a more contextualized and immersive pedagogy.169 Those who want
to see such changes have to make difficult choices about whether we want to
just do it ourselves in our own classes, or whether we seek more ambitiously
to bring others along with us. In the case of the former, we need only to find
ways to steer through an institutional curriculum approval process. For the
latter, though, we need broad coalition-building and probably a willingness
to collaborate and compromise.
We need to think about who is most willing and able to change their
model of law teaching: Younger faculty who may have less investment in
traditional modes of instruction (or in the lecture notes they may have honed
over the course of a career), but who may also be focused on tenure or more
generally on garnering recognition within their fields? Mid-career or more
senior faculty members who are ready for something new, but whose time
can be limited by the fact that they often bear the bulk of faculty governance
and institutional service in addition to being more sought-after for their
scholarly expertise? Should it be clinical faculty members, doctrinal teachers,
or professors of legal research and writing? Immersive teaching interrelates
aspects of all of these fields, and can thus be done by any. But there are likely
to be relational implications depending upon who leads the charge.170
Prospective immersion teachers will also have to be strategic in managing
their interactions with the people who hold the purse strings. Immersion
See Brent E. Newton, Preaching What They Don’t Practice: Why Law Faculties’
Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship and Devaluation of Practical Competencies
Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S.C. L. REV. 105 (2010). I do not actually agree
with the author’s conclusions that law faculty are obsessed with scholarship, or that
scholarship is necessarily in contention with practical education. But I entirely endorse the
notion that the legal academy tends to talk about changes in the ways we educate lawyers far
more than we actually change.
169
As an instructive example, Prof. Newton’s thoughtful critique offers insights that
legal education reformers might find genuinely valuable, but… I am hard-pressed to believe
most law professors would embrace being guided by a work that refers to their scholarly
endeavors as providing “little if any social utility” and represent “a colossal amount of
wasted resources.” Id. at 114.
170
One could argue that at least some programs traditionally thought to fall within the
LRW rubric but in fact emphasizing a far broader range of lawyering skills and
competencies, are already paving the way. Yet even law schools that enthusiastically
incorporate this immersive professional practice teaching in their curriculum have mostly
limited the methodology to the programs themselves, rather than seeing them as a model for
more widespread curricular innovation.
168

27-Feb-20]

Method Lawyering

47

courses do require resources which casebook courses simply do not routinely
need. But one thing we lawyers know is that managing interactions
persuasively often means aligning the relief sought with the interests of those
with the power to decide in our favor. Perhaps it can be helpful, then, to
remind deans and faculty who are on the fence about committing time and
money to immersion projects about all those judges, alumni, and other critics
of legal education who keep saying that law schools can, indeed must, do a
much better job of preparing our students of the future to become lawyers.171
V. IMMERSION METHODOLOGY AND LEGAL ED REFORM
Teaching by Experiential Immersion Draws Significantly from the Work
of Clinical Legal Education.
Is teaching by immersion simply another way of talking about clinical
teaching? Because it can be adopted with a primary purpose of teaching legal
doctrine, I don’t think so. But because it is driven by a client-based problemsolving approach, and so deeply enmeshes learning rules and skills in a
relational setting, it certainly shares a great deals with clinical methodology.
Legal scholars can and have quibbled about how exactly to describe
clinical methods.172 Yet I do not think it is much of a leap to suggest that
decades of work exploring clinical methods173 and simulation in law teaching
have arrived at some basic agreements about what they consists of. I concur
with Carolyn Grose’s sense that there exists at least a “loose consensus”
regarding what constitutes clinical/experiential pedagogy. 174 And although
clinical methodology may not be fully congruent with immersion teaching, it
is entirely consistent with it.175
171

Eli Wald, The Contextual Problem of Law Schools, 32 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 281 (2018) (considering the problem of teaching law “universally,” and arguing
for a wholesale commitment to context in the law school curriculum). It may be encouraging
that Sheldon Krantz and Michael Millemann found examples of some law schools moving
in that direction. Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, 94 NEB. L.
REV. 1 (2015).
172
Discussing the elements of the “clinical method,” Frank S. Bloch noted as long ago
as 1982 that “no single model… was universally accepted.” The Andragogical Basis of
Clinical Legal Education, 35 VAND. L. REV. 321, 326 (1982).
173
Perhaps beginning with Gary Bellow, On Teaching and Teachers: Some Preliminary
Reflections on Clinical Education as Methodology, CLINICAL EDUCATION FOR THE LAW
STUDENT 374 (1973). For a contemporary summary of clinical theory and methodology se
the premier anthology in the field, SUSAN BRYANT, ELLIOT S. MILSTEIN AND ANN C.
SHALLECK, TRANSFORMING THE EDUCATION OF LAWYERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
CLINICAL PEDAGOGY (2014) [hereinafter, CLINICAL PEDAGOGY].
174
Carolyn Grose, Beyond Skills Training, Revisited: The Clinical Education Spiral, 19
CLINICAL L. REV. 489, 497 (2019).
175
Maybe the only real departure from clinical instruction in our vision of immersion is
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Katherine Kruse’s characterization of the consensus themes in clinical
teaching are consistent with teaching by immersion:
1. Grounding learning in student-lawyers’ work on client problems
2. Teaching lawyering work as a process
3. Providing (insisting on?) multiple opportunities to learn from
critical reflection on their experiences.176
Perhaps an even more apt description is based on Jeff Giddings’s doctoral
research into clinical legal education programs, which defines the
fundamentals of experiential learning method as:
an intensive small group or solo learning experience in which
each student takes responsibility for legal and related work for
the client…in collaboration with a supervisor. Structures enable
each student to receive feedback on their contributions and to
take the opportunity to learn from their experiences through
reflecting on matters including their interactions with the client,
their colleagues, and their supervisor, as well as the ethical
dimensions of the issues raised and the impact of the law and
legal process.177
Both these accounts nicely encapsulate the approaches deployed in all of the
different versions of immersion courses using the scenarios in this Article.
Each posits that we begin from actual experience working with a specific
problem, then thoughtfully go about working on the problem, and that we
learn from careful examination of that work.
Yet our purposes are from those in most clinical courses. For my
immersion class, and to a significant degree for all of the different courses
that have so far been based on the Davis/Davenport narratives, a central
objective is to teach the core legal doctrine covered in the common casebook
course. In short, then, we draw from clinical methodology to create a richer
an effort to emphasize and explicitly reinforce doctrinal learning as a key objective of the
enterprise along with more traditional clinical goals of imparting practical skills and
professional values. “Emphasis” is used here quite intentionally, because I do not actually
view this as differing from what traditional clinical teaching actually does; merely from what
it tends most often to be seen as doing. I firmly believe clinical learning has always
incorporated and reinforced legal doctrine, Carnegie authors’ divisions notwithstanding. But
though clinical teachers likely agree—see, e.g., id. at 501-503—most discussions of clinical
pedagogy nonetheless accept the legal academy’s framing of doctrinal learning as primarily
occurring in casebook-based course work.
176
Paraphrased from id. at 498.
177
Jeff Giddings, Why No Clinic is an Island: The Merits and Challenges of Integrating
Clinical Insights Across the Law Curriculum, 34 WASH. U. J. L & POL’Y 261, 265 (2010).
Both this portrayal and Kruse’s share a common process of planning for/doing/critically
reflecting upon the work that real lawyers would undertake in a given scenario, which seems
to get to the heart of the processes of clinical instruction. See Myths and Misconceptions,
supra note ___, at 24.
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version of the more traditional law school classroom.
Teaching Legal Doctrine by Experiential Immersion is an Extension of
Much Current and Prior Thinking about Legal Education
Immersive law teaching is in many ways consonant with the proposals
for reforming legal education that were put forth by the influential Carnegie
Report in 2007.178 It is, though, probably more ambitiously radical.
The Carnegie approach classified coursework grounded in Langdellian
case dialogue as uniquely effective in inculcating one of the “three
apprenticeships” the Report identified as central to the making of new
lawyers.179 But the Report was more ambivalent about law schools’
effectiveness in professional or ethical training,180 and consequently called
on legal educators to incorporate additional training in practically-oriented
coursework to appropriately balance what it deemed the cognitive, ethical
and practical apprenticeships necessary to developing well-prepared
attorneys. 181 The Carnegie Report did call for an “integrative” approach to
the incorporation of the analytical, ethical and practical dimensions of legal
work rather than an “additive” one, but it did so only briefly. 182 And the
Report’s immense appreciation for the “signature pedagogy” of Socratic case
dialogue183 used almost exclusively throughout the first year of legal
education—and frequently thereafter184—may have led readers to mistakenly
178
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note ____. Though we many have moved past that era,
there was a significant period in which virtually all discussion of legal education referenced
the Carnegie Report, usually in the context of Roy Stuckey’s near-simultaneously-released
BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUCATION: A VISION AND A ROADMAP (2007) [just as a prior
cohort of reformers nearly universally referenced the equally visionary yet not ultimately
transformative task force report lead by Robert MacCrate in 1992, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT]. Both the Carnegie Report and Best Practices had
complementary, though not identical, notions of legal knowledge, skills and values, as well
as a similar desire to craft models of a more comprehensive legal education which paced
greater emphasis on experiential professional instructions. Not coincidentally, both of them
relied heavily on reflections from Peggy Cooper Davis. CARNEGIE REPORT at 39-40, 42, 57,
200-201; BEST PRACTICES at 99, 147, 207-209, 216-218.
179
CARNEGIE REPORT, id. at 47-74. See also William M. Sullivan, After Ten Years: The
Carnegie Report and Contemporary Legal Education, 14 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 331 335
(2018) (summarizing the report as having found that pervasive case-dialogue teaching in law
schools failed to provide “training in the full range of capacities needed for legal practice,”
and neglected the development of “ethical and contextual dispositions essential to
professional identity”).
180
Id. at 30-32, 89-91; 127-28
181
Id. at 194-97.
182
Id. at 191-92.
183
Id. at 23-34.
184
Criticized by Carnegie authors as potentially redundant and producing diminishing
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conclude that the drafters supported the introduction of more “integrated”185
coursework primarily in skills classes that would be coequal but adjacent to
more traditional casebook courses.
Notwithstanding the Carnegie authors’ possible intentions, a recent study
of the reach of post-Carnegie curricular innovation in law schools concluded
that where changes did occur they were most likely to involve lawyering
skills classes and/or clinical courses offered as electives in the second and
third years.186 Significantly, most current law professors—and law
students—would probably agree with Katherine R. Kruse’s assertion that the
legal academy still actively and passively dichotomizes legal theory from
legal practice.187 Kruse makes clear that this split is both conceptually untrue
(she calls it mythical188) and educationally unwise, and she argues that a wellbalanced law curriculum should consist of a progressive sequencing of
instruction that fully integrates doctrinal and professional skills learning.189
Kruse is hardly a lone voice articulating this claim; her critique of legal
education’s cramped cabining of legal doctrine and professional skills is
widely shared, though perhaps varyingly framed by different critics.190
In fact, in theorizing about ways to improve learning in 21st century law
schools, a lot of scholars have suggested teaching in ways that embed legal
doctrine within practical experiences.191 Using slightly different descriptive
returns. Id. at 75-78.
185
Professor Davis shares some of the Carnegie Report authors’ appreciation for the
educational value of Socratic dialogue, but advocates repositioning the goal as
“desegregating” analytical, ethical and practical teaching rather than “integrating” it. See
Peggy Cooper Davis, Desegregating Legal Education, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1271, 1291
(2010). See also Peggy Cooper Davis & Elizabeth Ehrenfest Steinglass, A Dialogue About
Socratic Teaching, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 249 (1998) (analyzing and illustrating
intensive Socratic inquiry in the law classroom).
186
Stephen Daniels, Martin Katz & William Sullivan, Analyzing Carnegie’s Reach: The
Contingent Nature of Innovation, 63 J. LEGAL EDUC. 585, 609 (2014).
187
Katherine R. Kruse, Legal Education and Professional Skills: Myths and
Misconceptions about Theory and Practice, 45 MCGEORGE L. REV. 7 (2013) (hereinafter
Myths and Misconceptions).
188
Id. at 9.
189
This echoes Anthony G. Amsterdam’s groundbreaking conception of staged legal
education as beginning from basic doctrinal and reasoning skills introduction, then applied
in finely-crafted simulation courses curated to refine practical skills and reinforce
conceptual learning, and concluding with closely-supervised apprenticeship experiences in
the form of live-client clinical work. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Clinical Legal Education-A
21st Century Perspective, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 612, 616 (1984).
190
Indeed, Gerald P. López contends that the vision embodied in clinical programs
should “define the fundamental orientation, design and staffing of every law school across
the country” Transform – Don’t Just Tinker With – Legal Education (Part II), 24 CLINICAL
L. REV. 247, 250 (2018).
191
For an early and especially influential example, see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The
Legacy of Clinical Education: Theories about Lawyering, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 555 (1980).
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language or frameworks than ours, numerous law professors began creating
such courses more than a generation ago.192
And yet…. Such courses are hardly ordinary. To the contrary, they still
generally remain unusual enough to warrant their own descriptive law review
articles.193 [If you are currently connected to a law school, ask yourself: is
there more than one such course offered? Is there even one at all?] Despite
persistent calls for substantial change, immersion-style instruction remains
reserved for specialized courses and usually ones in the upper-level
curriculum which are chiefly focused on strengthening professional skills. It
is not seen as a primary means of both teaching legal doctrine and integrating
(or to use Davis’ formulation, desegregating) ethical and professional
learning with mastery of legal rules and reasoning.
So why is it that immersive teaching is not a commonplace—even on its
way to becoming a signature—legal pedagogy?
Perhaps this is a byproduct of our unfortunate habit in the legal academy
of imagining the teaching of legal doctrine as distinct from practical
training.194 Or our hierarchies and differential categorization of the law
For more current examples see Jennifer E. Spreng, Suppose the Class Began the Day the
Case Walked in the Door: Accepting Standard 314’s Invitation to Imagine a More Powerful,
Professionally Authentic First-year Learning Experience, 95 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 421
(2018); Sheldon Krantz, Legal Education in Transition: Trends and Their Implications, 94
NEB. L. REV. 1, 18-29 (2015); R. Michael Cassidy, Reforming the Law School Curriculum
from the Top Down, 64 J. LEGAL EDUC. 428, 432-37 (2015).
Immersive teaching was also envisioned as central to student learning in the hypothetical
idealized learning-centered law school of the future as envisioned by Rebecca Flanagan in
Better by Design: Implementing Meaningful Change for the Next Generation of Lawyers, 71
ME. L. REV. 103, 106 (2018).
192
Paul Barron, Can Anything Be Done to Make the Upper-Level Law School Courses
More Interesting? 70 TUL. L. REV. 1881 (1996) (spoiler alert: yes) (describing an immersive
upper-level course in in bankruptcy law and advocating for more widespread adoption of the
methodology across a variety of substantive areas of law); Phyllis G. Coleman & Robert M.
Jarvis, Using Skills Training to Teach First-Year Contracts, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 725 (1996);
Roberto L. Corrada, Development, A Simulation of Union Organizing in a Labor Law Class,
46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 445 (1996); Robert G. Vaughn, Use of Simulations in a First-year Civil
Procedure Class, 45 L. LEGAL EDUC. 480 (1995); Stacy Caplow, Autopsy of a Murder: Using
Simulation to Teach First Year Criminal Law, 19 N. MEX. L. REV. 138 (1989).
193
See, e.g., Karl S. Coplan, Teaching Substantive Environmental Law and Practice
Skills Through Interest Group Role-Playing, 18 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 194 (2016); David B.
Oppenheimer, Using a Simulated Case File to Teach Civil Procedure: the Ninety-Percent
Solution, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 817 (2016).
194
The Analyzing Carnegie’s Reach study found far more movement toward
individually-initiated curricular innovation than it did meaningful alteration of faculty
development or in the traditional faculty incentive structures. Carnegie’s Reach, supra note
____ at 609-611. The survey’s authors found glimmers of hope for movement toward a more
coordinated model of lawyer preparation in the future, but concluded that for the most part,
integrated curricular innovation often continued to be isolated or “piecemeal” See id. at 609.
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teachers who do primarily Socratic case-method teaching195 from those
whose teaching emphasizes practical skills and professional ethics.196 Maybe
it is due to fear or overwork. Concerns about expertise (and lack of). 197 The
linear ease and ready availability of a course design driven by the process of
casebook selection.198 Concerns about topical coverage and/or substantive
depth.199 Perhaps despite the many calls for legal education reform and the
clear desire of the bar,200 there is not yet a firm consensus that learning in law
school ought to be more integrated.
But I simply do not believe that last conjecture is true. Though I am quite
certain there are some holdouts, and of course there must be those who have
legitimate methodological questions to raise, a familiarity with the legal ed
literature over recent decades suggests that time for debate about integrated
learning in law school may have passed.201 I therefore presume that there
already exists a relatively widespread consensus in support of innovative
immersive experiential learning in law schools,202 and that nonetheless we
195
Although apart from history and habit there is no reason why attention to these other
aspects of lawyers’ training cannot have an important place in the doctrinal classroom. See
Paula Schaefer, A Primer on Professionalism for Doctrinal Professors, 81 TENN. L. REV.
277 (2014) (calling on all teachers of legal doctrine to explicitly integrate ‘attorney
professionalism” into their course objectives and outlining means of doing so).
196
For but one recent reference to the negative effects of stratification within law
teaching, see Lawprofblog, Legal Writing Professors: A Story of A Hierarchy Within a
Hierarchy,
ABOVE
THE
LAW,
(Sept.
4,
2018,
404
PM),
https://abovethelaw.com/2018/09/legal-writing-professors-a-story-of-a-hierarchy-within-ahierarchy/.
197
See Martin J. Katz, Facilitating Better Law Teaching—Now, 62 EMORY L.J. 823, 833
(2013) (raising a concern that “not every professor has the type of training that prepares them
to do good simulations”) (hereinafter Facilitating Better Law Teaching).
198
See MICHAEL HUNTER SCHWARTZ, SOPHIE SPARROW & GERALD HESS, TEACHING
LAW BY DESIGN, 37-54 (esp. 45-47) (2009) (urging law faculty to design courses
intentionally and with an emphasis on learning goals, and only secondarily selecting
casebooks to complement those objectives).
199
Coverage of topical material is a perennial—though perhaps overstated—concern in
most doctrinally-focused law classes. Id. at 48. Depth of exploration of central legal
questions also matters tremendously. We believe immersion teaching can actually emphasize
either or both. Simulation design can be modified to give broad exposure to myriad topics in
immersion classes, to stimulate intense inquiry into principal themes, or to balance both.
200
See Mark A. Cohen, Law Schools Must Restructure. It Won’t Be Easy, FORBES, MAY
15, 2017, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/markcohen1/2017/05/15/law-schoolsmust-restructure-it-wont-be-easy/#2f86efc03d3f; Bruce Antkowiak, Op-Ed, Law Schools
Must Reform, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 4, 2011, available at https://www.postgazette.com/opinion/Op-Ed/2011/01/04/Law-schools-must-reform/stories/201101040170.
201
How Experiential Learning in Law Schools Became Widely Accepted, LEGAL REBELS
PODCAST (Aug. 14, 2019) (interview with law school dean Rodney Smolla, who declares
“now experiential learning is pretty much accepted by everybody”).
202
Grounded, as SpearIt and Stephanie Smith Ledesma observe, in a richly-developed
literature that recognizes the influence of such educational theorists as John Dewey and Paolo
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are not yet providing as much of it as we do actually agree we should. This is
likely due to structural inducements,203 some combination of the factors listed
in the preceding paragraph, and inertia. And in an absence of multiple
immersive experiential models from most of our own legal educations, it
undoubtedly also stems from just not knowing where to start or what the
courses would and should look like.
I hope this Article provides at least one sample to begin the exciting work
of imagining this more integrated way to teach and learn law.

CONCLUSION
The narratives and commentaries included here are not intended to be
exhaustive. There is certainly more that can be said on most (probably all)
topics touched on. This piece is meant, though, to showcase some of the kinds
of thinking that law students do in immersion classes, and the kinds of
thinking that goes into implementing them. It is meant to show how much is
accomplished all at once in such learning: consolidation of doctrine,
analytical skills and tuning innumerable professional skills.
And to encourage more people to do it.
And to show that it is fun.
And possible.

Friere. Experiential Education as Critical Pedagogy: Enhancing the Law school Experience,
38 NOVA L. REV. 249, 253-54 (2014).
203
Which many scholars have written about and which probably pose a significant
barrier. I certainly do not want to downplay the institutional incentives that so often leave
curricular innovation to the individual enterprise of the unusually energetic, rather than to
the legal academic establishment. But I likewise do not want to be limited by those realities.
There is much momentum toward change in legal education and it is helpful, perhaps but not
necessarily unrealistically, to assume that there will be more. Reflecting on faculty buy-in
for curricular reform emphasizing simulations and other experiential learning opportunities
at Denver Law School, Martin J. Katz concluded generating broad faculty support, even
despite some concerns and objections, was attainable through a shared planning process.
Facilitating Better Law Teaching, supra note ___, at 842-43.

